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A Rational Theory of Mitigation and 
Aggravation in Sentencing: Why Less is More 
When it Comes to Punishing Criminals  
MIRKO BAGARIC†  
INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing involves the intentional infliction of pain.1 It 
is the legal domain where the state acts in its most forceful 
manner against individuals. It is important that the 
sentencing system is fair and effective. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. In the sentencing arena there is a gulf between 
knowledge and practice. Sentencing is a politicized domain, 
and hence, law and practice are often detached from 
knowledge. This is evident in four key areas of sentencing 
policy and practice. 
Most broadly, it relates to the ongoing uncertainty 
regarding which theory of punishment should underpin the 
system. Retributivism has replaced utilitarianism as the 
most popular contemporary theory of punishment;2 however, 
the change has not heavily impacted legislative and judicial 
developments and certainly traditional utilitarian aims 
continue to heavily influence sentencing practice and policy. 
Secondly, a lack of empirical and scientific certainty remains 
regarding the efficacy of state-imposed punishment to 
achieve key (utilitarian) goals of sentencing in the form of 
incapacitation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and 
rehabilitation.3 Moreover, to the extent that convergence 
exists regarding the efficacy of sentencing to attain these 
  
† Professor and Dean of Law, Deakin University, Melbourne. 
 1. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 158-59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); C.L. TEN, CRIME 
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 2 (1987).  
 2. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 
MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 131-33 (2000) [hereinafter Bagaric & Amarasekara, The 
Errors of Retributivism]. 
 3. See infra Part VI. 
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objectives, this knowledge generally has not been applied in 
a manner that shapes sentencing law and practice. 
Thirdly, while there is a wide-ranging consensus that the 
principle of proportionality4 should be the dominant criterion 
determining penalty nature and length, the content of the 
principle remains unstable and nebulous. In its most basic 
and influential form, proportionalism is the theory that the 
punishment should fit the crime.5 However, the vagaries 
associated with the content of the principle are so pronounced 
that it is verging on doctrinal and intellectual fiction to 
suggest that an objective answer can be given to common 
sentencing dilemmas, such as how many years’ 
imprisonment is equivalent to the pain felt by an assault or 
rape victim, or whether a burglar should be dealt with by way 
of imprisonment or fine, or the appropriate sanction for a 
drug trafficker. There is no demonstrable violation of 
proportionalism if a mugger, robber, or drug trafficker is 
sentenced to either ten months or ten years imprisonment. 
Finally, the least developed and settled area of 
sentencing law relates to the considerations that operate to 
increase or decrease a penalty beyond the standard penalty 
for the relevant offense type. These factors are known as 
aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
There are no standard definitions of what constitute 
aggravating or mitigating factors. However, as a matter of 
principle, an aggravating factor is a consideration that is not 
contained within the elements of the offense, which makes 
the offense worse or otherwise justifies a heavier penalty. A 
mitigating factor is a consideration that justifies a more 
lenient penalty.6 
Common aggravating factors include prior criminal 
history and breach of trust. Widely accepted mitigating 
factors include cooperating with authorities and having a 
  
 4. See infra Part VII (discussing that proportionality, in essence, is the view 
that the harshness of the punishment should match the severity of the 
seriousness of the crime). 
 5. See infra Part VII. 
 6. Marker v The Queen [2002] WASCA 282, ¶ 22 (Court of Criminal Appeal) 
(Austl.). 
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minor role in the crime. However, there is not even a loose 
consensus regarding the operation of most mitigating and 
aggravating considerations, despite the fact that the 
presence of an aggravating or mitigating consideration can 
have a profound impact on a penalty. For example, prior 
criminality can add ten years or more to the length of a prison 
term for some offenses in the United States.7 
Most factors that serve to increase or decrease penalties 
have emerged in an ad hoc manner, not underpinned by a 
clear objective, and, normally, the weight and emphasis 
placed on them in determining penalty is unclear. This area 
of law is “under-researched”8 and in need of extensive 
analysis. Current jurisprudence is so shallow and unsettled 
that some factors can be either mitigatory or aggravating.9 
Factors that tend to increase or decrease penalty have 
evolved impressionistically; so much so that Andrew 
Ashworth has commented that “this is a sphere in which 
discretion has led largely to anarchy.”10 He adds that “[t]he 
role of aggravating and mitigating factors is . . . left 
largely . . . unbridled and untamed, a tendency that 
undermines the rationale of sentencing guidelines in 
providing common starting points and shared standards.”11 
This Article attempts to address this gap in the literature 
and law and develops a coherent doctrinal rationale for 
aggravating and mitigating sentencing considerations12 in 
  
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and 
Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 1 
(Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011). 
 9. Id. at 3.  
 10. Andrew Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and 
Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 17 
(Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011). 
 11. Id. at 17 (citing Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Justice, Rights and 
Sentencing: A Review of Sentencing Policy and Problems, 30-31 (1987) 
(unpublished manuscript) (Worcester College, Oxford), and Claire Corbett, 
Magistrates’ and Court Clerks’ Sentencing Behaviour: An Experimental Study, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENTENCING: APPROACHES TO CONSISTENCY AND DISPARITY 
(Donald C. Pennington & Sally Llyod-Bostock eds., 1987)). 
 12. Allan Mason, The Search for Principles of Mitigation: Integrating Cultural 
Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 40-41 (Julian V. 
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order to harmonize and justify this area of the body of law. It 
is a particularly important issue to resolve at this juncture. 
Recently the Federal Sentencing Commission in the United 
States has recognized the open-ended nature of aggravating 
and mitigating considerations13 and hence there is now 
greater scope to influence the development of this area of the 
law.  
By way of background and context, this Article focuses 
on existing sentencing law in the United States and 
Australia. Those jurisdictions are considered because they 
have contrasting approaches to mitigating and aggravating 
factors. With only a hint of exaggeration, in Australia nearly 
every consideration potentially aggravates or mitigates 
(there are several hundred such considerations);14 while, in 
the United States, very few factors aggravate or mitigate (in 
most jurisdictions there are only two to three dozen factors 
approximately that increase or decrease a penalty).15 The 
contrast between the richness and the dearth of aggravating 
and mitigating considerations in Australia and the United 
States provides a fertile and illuminating context to this 
continually evolving but jurisprudentially vacuous area of 
law. The conclusions reached in this Article are transferrable 
to all sentencing systems. 
In the next Part of the Article, I provide an overview of 
the existing sentencing regimes in the United States and 
Australia with a focus on aggravating and mitigating 
considerations. In Part III, I argue that the approaches in 
both systems are logically, empirically, and jurisprudentially 
  
Roberts ed., 2011) (arguing that it is not tenable to find principles that define 
mitigating factors adequately because of the complex range of factors that impact 
on sentencing—which go beyond normative principles and include cultural 
factors). 
 13. See Amy Baron-Evans & Jennifer Niles Coffin, No More Math Without 
Subtraction: Deconstructing the Guidelines’ Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Mitigating Factors, LITIGATING MITIGATING FACTORS: DEPARTURES, VARIANCES, 
AND ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (Defender Servs. Office Training Div., 
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 15, 2011, at i-iii. 
 14. Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: Reducing 
the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 
19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 371 n.113 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, From 
Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing]. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
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flawed. The rest of the Article develops a unifying theory to 
cohere this area of law. 
I conclude that considerations should only aggravate or 
mitigate a sentence if they: (i) advance an objective of 
sentencing (which itself is justifiable); (ii) are necessary to 
give effect to the proportionality principle; (iii) are justified 
by reference to broader objectives of the criminal justice 
system; or (iv) are supported by reference to the 
requirements of broader (concrete) principles of justice. 
The application of this framework results in a clear 
demarcation of a small number of aggravating and 
mitigating considerations. It is recommended that legislative 
changes should be made to incorporate these considerations 
into the sentencing system, while, at the same time, 
abolishing all other aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Further research may increase or reduce the number of 
aggravating or mitigating factors. Accordingly, the list set 
out in this Article is neither set in stone nor conclusive. 
However, the rationale and methodology advanced in this 
Article set out a coherent procedure for assessing the validity 
of putative sentencing considerations. 
Before dealing with the core issue in this Article, I 
elaborate on the importance and limits of the current 
discussion to the sentencing landscape as a whole. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AGGRAVATION AND 
MITIGATION “RIGHT” 
Sentencing is a purposeful endeavor, and to operate 
fairly and efficiently it must be grounded in coherent and 
sound normative theory and have clear and attainable 
objectives, which are empirically validated. As noted above, 
broadly, there are four different levels of inquiry that exist in 
the sentencing realm. A model sentencing system can only be 
maintained if there is strategic clarity and alignment in all 
four areas. The broadest level of inquiry concerns the 
justification for state-imposed punishment. 
There are two main theories of punishment. 
Utilitarianism is the view that punishment is inherently bad 
due to the pain it causes the wrongdoer but is ultimately 
justified because the pain is outweighed by the good 
1164 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
consequences stemming from it.16 The main competing 
theory, and the one which enjoys the most contemporary 
support, is retributivism.17 Potentially, the choice of the 
theory of punishment that underpins sentencing is important 
because it logically guides the sentencing objectives that 
should be pursued. Utilitarianism promotes the pursuit of 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, while 
retributivism is synonymous with “just deserts” and gives 
priority to proportionalism as the key sentencing objective.18 
The next main level of inquiry relates to the concrete 
objectives that should be pursued by the sentencing system. 
Typically, the main objectives pursued are general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. The soundness of pursuing those goals, 
however, is logically contingent on the efficacy of criminal 
sanctions to achieve them. That is an empirical question. 
The third level of inquiry attempts to match the 
seriousness of the crime with the harshness of the 
punishment. That is the proportionality requirement. The 
importance of proportionalism is impacted potentially by the 
theory of punishment chosen. Further, it can also be 
impacted by the pursuit of sentencing objectives. For 
example, attempts to achieve the goals of general deterrence 
or incapacitation could result in harsher penalties being 
imposed than are commensurate with the seriousness of the 
offenses. 
In addition, and this is the fourth level of inquiry, it is 
necessary to differentiate when penalties should be adjusted 
from those that are deemed to be proportionate to the gravity 
of the crime (and which incorporate adjustments for any 
relevant sentencing objectives). It is at this point that 
aggravating and mitigating factors come into play. 
Aggravating factors operate to increase the severity of 
  
 16. See Bagaric & Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, supra note 2, at 
130-31. 
 17. See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 211 (rev. 
ed. 1984); David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic 
Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997). 
 18. See Bagaric & Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, supra note 2, at 
131 nn. 23-24. 
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punishment, while the effect of mitigating factors is to reduce 
the harshness of the appropriate sanction.19 Thus, logically, 
aggravating and mitigating factors are the fourth and last 
tier of inquiry into an appropriate sentence. 
However, bottom tier in this case does not equate to the 
least important. In fact, aggravating and mitigating factors 
are often the most influential and important considerations 
regarding the choice and length of penalty. The most 
powerful factor influencing penalty severity in many 
jurisdictions, apart from offense type, is the offender’s prior 
criminal history.20 Further, the most significant mitigating 
factor in some jurisdictions is cooperation with law 
enforcement officials which can reduce penalty length by up 
to fifty percent.21 Thus, the discussion in this Article is 
relevant to all core aspects of sentencing law and practice, 
and the conclusions reached apply irrespective of which over-
arching theory of punishment is applied. 
The next Part of the Article discusses the existing law 
relating to aggravating and mitigating considerations. I then 
explain why the choice of the theory of the punishment which 
justifies sentencing practice does not, in fact, influence the 
validity of potential aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
why all sentencing objectives except incapacitation should 
not inform the identification of such considerations. I then 
establish an over-arching theory of aggravation and 
mitigation and set out the considerations that, on the basis 
of current learning, should properly reduce or increase a 
penalty. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW  
This Part of the Article focuses on current aggravating 
and mitigating considerations. I first consider the relevant 
law in the United States followed by the law in Australia. The 
analysis provides the context and backdrop to demonstrate 
the need for fundamental reform in this area. 
  
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part IX. 
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A.  Aggravation and Mitigation in the United States 
Each state of the United States has its own sentencing 
system, and there is considerable divergence across the 
respective regimes.22 The federal jurisdiction also has a 
discrete sentencing system, which is important because of 
the large number of offenders sentenced under that system 
and the considerable doctrinal influence it has at the state 
level.23 Despite the sentencing variations across the United 
States, several key commonalities and themes exist. 
The key distinguishing aspect of the United States 
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most 
other sentencing systems in the world) is the wide-ranging 
use of fixed or presumptive minimum penalties that exist, in 
some form, in all U.S. states.24 As noted by Berman and 
Bibas, “[o]ver the last half-century, sentencing has lurched 
from a lawless morass of hidden, unreviewable discretion to 
a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules.”25 
None of these policies and practices emanates from a 
clear theoretical foundation, but rather stem from “back-of-
an-envelope calculations and collective intuitive 
judgments.”26 Despite this, there is a convergence of 
  
 22. Sentencing (and, more generally, the criminal law) in the United States is 
mainly the province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-
11 (2000). For more extensive analysis of the operation of sentencing in the United 
States and Australia, see Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing, 
supra note 14.  
 23. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 
4 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 37, 40-41 (2006). 
 24. See CTR. FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012) 
(noting that 137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties 
but none of the others was as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States). 
 25. Berman & Bibas, supra note 23, at 40. 
 26. MICHAEL TONRY, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to 
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 93 
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For criticism of the 
guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical 
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2005); Judge James 
S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (2010). 
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approach: “Modern sentencing reforms have repudiated 
rehabilitation as a dominant goal of sentencing. Many 
structured sentencing laws, including many guideline 
sentencing systems and severe mandatory minimum 
sentences, are designed principally to deter, incapacitate, 
and punish offenders.”27 
Most prescribed penalties are set out in sentencing grids 
that typically use criminal history score28 and offense 
seriousness to calculate an appropriate penalty. The grids 
have a heavy emphasis on incapacitation. Perhaps the 
greatest indication of the harshness of U.S. sentencing is the 
rapid increase in imprisonment numbers over the past 
twenty years.29 The U.S. now imprisons more of its citizens 
than any other country; thus, its rate of imprisonment is also 
the highest on earth.30 Presently, more than 1.5 million 
Americans are in state or federal prison facilities.31 There are 
approximately 200,000 federal prisoners and 1.3 million 
state prisoners.32 If one includes the 744,500 inmates in local 
jails, the total incarceration number is 2,240,600, which 
equates to over 700 people per 100,000 adult population.33 
This number peaked in 2009, after increasing more than 
400% in three decades.34 The prison population has dropped 
  
 27. Berman & Bibas, supra note 23, at 48. 
 28. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior 
convictions. 
 29. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN 
ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991-2012, at 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf. 
 30. INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
 31. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29. 
 32. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2012, at 10 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 3.  
 34. On December 31, 1978, the number of prisoners was 294,000 and on 
December 31, 2009, it was 1,555,600. Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29, at 1. 
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for the past three years, but the reduction in overall terms 
has been small—42,600 inmates (i.e., less than 3%).35 
Most developed countries have rates of imprisonment 
around five times less than the United States.36 In terms of 
prisoners per 100,000 adult population, the rate in Canada is 
118, Australia 143, and the United Kingdom 149.37 The 
United States’ imprisonment rate is approximately ten times 
that of Scandinavian countries.38 
However, at least formally, incapacitation does not 
overwhelm the sentencing objectives in the United States. As 
noted by Traum, even in the federal system in 2008 only 
approximately 28% of offenders are convicted under a statute 
imposing a mandatory minimum.39 
The most extensively analyzed and influential fixed 
penalty laws are those set out in the United States 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the “Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines”).40 The Guidelines provide a useful 
context to the current range of considerations that can 
increase a penalty in the United States. They are important 
not only because they have had a considerable impact on 
state sentencing law but also because they stipulate a greater 
number of aggravating considerations than many state 
sentencing regimes.41  
  
 35. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012, supra note 29, at 1. 
On December 31, 2012, there were, in fact, 1,574,000 prisoners. 
 36. See INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Per 100,000 adult population, the rate of imprisonment in Norway is 72, 
Finland 58, and Sweden 60. Id. 
 39. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 
451 (2012). 
 40. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 
GUIDELINES MANUAL 394 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-pdf/2013_Guidelines_Manual_Full.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N]; see also Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 
13, at iii, for analysis and criticism of the Guidelines. 
 41. For an overview of aggravating and mitigating factors in state legislative 
schemes, see Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing 
Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1128-29 (2008). She notes that, like the Federal 
Scheme, state non-capital schemes generally have more aggravating than 
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In the Federal Sentencing Guideline system the range for 
an offense is determined by reference to two main 
considerations. The first is the offense level, which entails an 
assessment of the seriousness of the offense (this often 
includes a number of variables and, depending on the offense, 
can include the nature of any injury caused or monetary 
amount involved).42 The second is the offender’s criminal 
history score, which is based on the seriousness of the past 
offenses and the time that has elapsed since the prior 
offending.43 These two calculations then operate to prescribe 
a sentencing range.44 Thus, for example, an offense at level 
20, for an offender with a criminal history score of 4, 5, or 6, 
has a range of forty-one to fifty-one months; an offense at 
level 36, for an offender with a criminal history score of 4, 5, 
or 6, has a range of 235 to 293 months.45 
There are forty-three different levels, with the penalties 
increasing as the levels increase.46 An increase of six levels 
approximately doubles the sentence.47 Where the range 
includes a term of imprisonment, it is relatively narrow in 
that it cannot exceed the minimum penalty by more than the 
  
mitigating considerations. Id. There are seventeen states that set out both 
aggravating and mitigating factors and, of these, twelve have more aggravating 
considerations; two states have an equal number; three have more mitigating 
considerations; and six states only identify aggravating considerations. Id. The 
states with the highest number of combined aggravating considerations are: 
Alaska (51); Illinois (49); North Carolina (44); Tennessee (35); Washington (34); 
California (32); Louisiana (31); and Florida (29). States with low numbers are: 
Hawaii (16); Idaho (15); Kansas (13); and Ohio (12). Id. at 1128-32. The fact that 
there are generally more aggravating than mitigating considerations is consistent 
with public opinion, which suggests that aggravating factors bear more heavily 
on crime severity than mitigating considerations. See Julian V. Roberts & Mike 
Hough, Exploring Public Attitudes to Sentencing Factors in England and Wales, 
in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 168, 183 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 
2011). 
 42. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 394-96. 
 43. Id. at 396. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 395-96. 
 46. Id. at 395. 
 47. Id. at 11.  
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greater of six months or twenty-five percent.48 
Proportionality is pursued “through a system that imposes 
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of 
differing severity.”49 The sentencing ranges were not 
developed in abstract or against a purely theoretical model. 
They were influenced by an analysis of over 40,000 sentences 
that had been imposed.50 
These Guidelines are no longer mandatory, following the 
United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Booker.51 The Guidelines are now advisory.52 However, 
  
 48. Id. at 2.  
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. See id. at 11 (“The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial 
guidelines with considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal 
statutes in the United States Code. It began with those that were the basis for a 
significant number of prosecutions and sought to place them in a rational order. 
It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of these provisions 
and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied 
on pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses 
based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 
augmented pre-sentence reports, the parole guidelines, and policy judgments.”). 
 51. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that aspects 
of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011); 
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 265 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 52. Consequently, District Courts are required to properly calculate and 
consider the guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(a)(5) (2012); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district 
courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account 
when sentencing.”); Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (“As a matter of administration and to 
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and 
the initial benchmark.”); Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (stating that a district court should 
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range). The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence in 
a particular case, therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline 
range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy statements, and then the 
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita, 551 U.S. at 338. The appellate court 
engages in a two-step process upon review:  
[The appellate court] first ensure[s] that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range . . . [and] then consider[s] the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
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sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in 
approximately sixty percent of cases.53 Set penalties apply to 
most types of offenses, including drug, fraud, and 
immigration crime. 
While criminal history score and offense severity are 
cardinal sentencing considerations, they do not exhaust all of 
the matters that influence the penalty. The considerations 
that impact a sentence are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which 
states: 
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE—The 
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of 
this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence 
to be imposed, shall consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
  
discretion standard[,] . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the 
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines 
range.  
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 53. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of 
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 
(2010); see also Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13. For a discussion regarding 
the potential of mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing, see 
William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in 
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 247 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011). 
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(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant, as set forth in the guidelines— . . .  
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.54 
As noted above, the Guideline range is heavily influenced 
by the offender’s criminal history score.55 The Guidelines also 
expressly set out over three dozen considerations that can 
affect the penalty and set out several considerations that 
should not have an impact on penalty.56 
In order to determine a sufficient but not excessive 
sentence that is appropriate, the courts can factor in a 
number of mitigating and aggravating considerations. They 
come in two main forms. “Adjustments” are defined 
considerations that increase or decrease the penalty by a 
designated amount.57 For example, a demonstration of 
remorse can result in a decreased penalty by up to two levels, 
which can increase to three levels if it is accompanied by an 
early guilty plea.58 The main adjustments relate to the 
characteristics of the offender. As noted above, the prior 
  
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the 
operation of this provision, see Berry, supra note 53; Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra 
note 13. 
 55. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 388. Associated to this is that 
reliance on criminal activity for livelihood is also aggravating (§ 4B1.3). It is 
expressly stated that dismissed and uncharged conduct do not aggravate. Id. at 
467. 
 56. For a historical overview of the development of aggravating and mitigating 
considerations in the Guidelines see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 1-8. 
 57. These are set out in chapter 3 of the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 40, at 336-68. 
 58. Id. § 3E1.1. However, § 5K2.0 (d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart 
from a guideline range as a result of “[t]he defendant’s decision, in and of itself, 
to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the 
offense (i.e., a departure may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant 
decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be 
based on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is 
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court. See 
§ 6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreement).” Id. 
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criminal history of the offender can have a profound impact 
on the penalty. However, other than this consideration, most 
factors personal to the offender are intended to have only a 
relatively minor impact on penalty. To this end, the 
Guidelines provide: 
Although the court must consider “the history and characteristics 
of the defendant” among other factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in 
order to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the court should 
not give them excessive weight. Generally, the most appropriate 
use of specific offender characteristics is to consider them not as a 
reason for a sentence outside the applicable guideline range but for 
other reasons, such as in determining the sentence within the 
applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or 
imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the 
applicable Zone on the Sentencing Table, and various other aspects 
of an appropriate sentence. To avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct, see, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 28 
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), the guideline range, which reflects the 
defendant’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s criminal history, 
should continue to be “the starting point and the initial 
benchmark.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).59 
The other main category of aggravating and mitigating 
considerations is known as a “departure.” If a departure is 
applicable, the court can more readily impose a sentence 
outside the applicable guideline range. Moreover, the 
Guidelines permit, in rare instances, considerations that are 
not set out in the Guidelines to justify departing from the 
guideline range.60 This means the range of aggravating and 
mitigating considerations set out in the Guidelines is not 
exhaustive. Where a court departs from the applicable 
guideline range, it is required to state the reason for the 
departure.61 
I first provide an overview of the main aggravating 
factors and then do the same in relation to the mitigating 
factors. Prior to doing so, it is pertinent to note that there has 
recently been a considered analysis of the operation of 
  
 59. Id. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. § 5K2.0(a)(B); see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011); 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 61. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.0(e). 
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mitigating and aggravating factors in the Guidelines.62 
However, this analysis is empirical and descriptive in that it 
collates data regarding the actual application of the 
considerations by the courts. This type of analysis is useful 
because it can expose failings in the law, for example, the 
courts not properly applying the Guidelines as intended. 
What is lacking is an attempt to inject coherency in the 
aggravating and mitigating system—which is the primary 
objective of this Article. 
Apart from an offender’s prior criminal history, the most 
wide-ranging aggravating factor is the offender’s role in the 
offense. It is expressly stated that a sentence can be 
increased if the offender is an organizer or leader or manager 
of a criminal activity.63 
The remaining aggravating factors can be divided into 
three broad categories. The first is the manner in which the 
offense is committed, which supposedly makes the crime 
worse. A crime is made more serious if it involves any of the 
following sixteen aspects: 
 an abuse of a position of trust or use of special 
skill;64 
 use of a minor to commit a crime;65 
 the use of body armor in the course of drug 
trafficking crimes and crimes of violence;66 
 terrorism;67 
 a serious violation of human rights;68 
 obstructing or impeding the administration of 
justice;69 
  
 62. See Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13. 
 63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 3B1.1(a). 
 64. Id. § 3B1.3. 
 65. Id. § 3B1.4. 
 66. Id. § 3B1.5. 
 67. Id. § 3A1.4. 
 68. Id. § 3A1.5. 
 69. Id. § 3C1.1. 
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 reckless endangerment during flight;70 
 committing an offense while on release;71 
 false registration of a domain name;72 
 extreme conduct (i.e., conduct that is unusually 
heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the 
victim);73 
 the use of weapons and dangerous 
instrumentalities;74 
 the possession of a semi-automatic firearm in 
connection with a crime of violence or controlled 
substance offense;75 
 being part of a violent street gang;76 
 the crime was committed while the defendant 
wore an official, or counterfeit official, insignia or 
uniform;77 
 abduction or unlawful restraint;78 or 
 the crime being committed to conceal another 
crime.79 
There is no systematic attempt to explain the basis for 
these considerations. Some factors would seem to have a 
degree of intuitive appeal because they relate to conduct that 
is manifestly seriously damaging. However, the utility of 
many of the factors is unclear given that they relate to 
conduct that is a separate offense (e.g., terrorism, abduction, 
or the use of a firearm). In other cases it is unclear why the 
factor makes the offense worse; for example, registering a 
  
 70. Id. § 3C1.2. 
 71. Id. § 3C1.3. 
 72. Id. § 3C1.4. 
 73. Id. § 5K2.8. 
 74. Id. § 5K2.6. 
 75. Id. § 5K2.17. 
 76. Id. § 5K2.18. 
 77. Id. § 5K2.24. 
 78. Id. § 5K2.4. 
 79. Id. § 5K2.9. 
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false domain would not seem to be especially heinous and, in 
some cases, the reference point of the consideration is 
curious. For example, in relation to the second aggravating 
factor—while it is tenable to argue that using a minor to 
commit a crime makes the crime worse—committing a crime 
against a minor is manifestly worse and consistency 
commands that the later consideration should also be 
included in the list.  
There are four aggravating factors relating to the victim, 
namely where: 
 the offense is motivated by hate;80 
 the victim is vulnerable;81 
 the victim is an official;82 and 
 the offense involved restraint of the victim.83 
Once again, there is some intuitive appeal associated 
with these considerations, but that is where the appeal seems 
to end. It is not clear that a victim who is raped or assaulted 
at random is any less damaged than one who is targeted 
because of an attribute that prompts hatred by the offender. 
And, certainly from the community’s point of view, 
apparently random crimes can be more disturbing than 
targeted offenses. Also, crimes against officials are 
undesirable but at least the victims have an institutional 
framework to support them. Hence, it is not clear that these 
offenses are worse than those against other members of the 
community. 
The outcome of the offense can be aggravating. To this 
end, the Guidelines expressly provide that if any of the 
following six outcomes arise from an offense, an increase in 
penalty is justified (and, possibly, a departure from the 
presumptive range): 
  
 80. Id. § 3A1.1(a). 
 81. Id. § 3A1.1(b)(1). 
 82. Id. § 3A1.2. 
 83. Id. § 3A1.3. 
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 death;84 
 physical injury;85 
 extreme psychological injury;86 
 property damage or loss;87 
 disruption of governmental function;88 or 
 endangerment of national security, public health, 
or safety.89 
These harm-oriented aggravating circumstances are the 
least controversial. As we shall see, they are justified by 
reference to the principle of proportionality. While there are 
twenty-nine aggravating considerations set out in the 
Guidelines (including prior convictions and role in the 
offense), there are considerably fewer mitigating factors—in 
fact, only thirteen such factors exist. Partly the reason for 
this is that “mitigating and aggravating factors do not 
represent different sides of the same coin”.90 Thus, for 
example, while a vulnerable victim increases the penalty, a 
robust and resilient victim does not reduce the sanction. The 
fact that there are more aggravating than mitigating factors 
is also consistent with the trend in other jurisdictions in the 
United States.91 
The first mitigating category relates to the offender’s role 
in the offense. A minor role in the offense can result in a 
penalty reduction from two to four levels.92 Several other 
considerations can mitigate because of the circumstances of 
  
 84. Id. § 5K2.1. 
 85. Id. § 5K2.2. 
 86. Id. § 5K2.3. 
 87. Id. § 5K2.5. 
 88. Id. § 5K2.7. 
 89. Id. § 5K2.14. 
 90. Roberts & Hough, supra note 41, at 183.  
 91. Hessick, supra note 41, at 1128-29 (noting that, “of the seventeen systems 
that identify both aggravating and mitigating factors, twelve states identify more 
aggravating than mitigating factors; three states identify more mitigating than 
aggravating factors; and two states identify an equal number of aggravating and 
mitigating factors.”). 
 92. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 3B1.2. 
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the offense. In effect, these considerations relate to situations 
which are grounded in criminal defenses but are not so 
pronounced as to exculpate the offender. The considerations 
are: 
 where the offender committed the crime to avoid a 
greater harm;93 
 if the defendant committed the offense under 
serious coercion or duress;94 
 if the crime was committed when the offender was 
experiencing reduced mental capacity;95 and 
 where the offender was provoked by the victim.96 
As discussed in Part VII, there is doctrinal justification 
for most of these considerations but they need to be grounded 
in a coherent theory. 
The other remaining mitigating factors can be divided 
into three categories. The first is the offender’s response to the 
charge. Thus, the following considerations will reduce 
penalty: 
 if the offender voluntarily discloses the offense, which 
was unlikely to be otherwise discovered;97 
 if the offender provides substantial assistance to au-
thorities;98 and 
 if the offender demonstrates remorse (which can re-
sult in a decrease of penalty by up to two levels, and 
can increase to three levels if it is accompanied by an 
early guilty plea).99 
  
 93. Id. § 5K2.11. 
 94. Id. § 5K2.12. For a discussion of this consideration, see Baron-Evans & 
Coffin, supra note 13, at 164-67.  
 95. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.13. For a discussion of this 
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 164-74. 
 96. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5K2.10. 
 97. Id. § 5K2.16. 
 98. Id. § 5K1.1. Thus, it can justify a departure from the guidelines. Refusal to 
assist authorities is not aggravating. Id. § 5K1.2. 
 99. Id. § 3E1.1. However, § 5K2.0(d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart 
from a guideline range as a result of  
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All of these considerations are widely endorsed. 
However, it is not apparent that remorse should reduce the 
penalty given that it is a reasonable minimum expectation of 
any citizen. This theme, as well as the appropriate reduction 
for assisting authorities and pleading guilty, is discussed at 
great length in Part IX of this Article. 
Another category involves matters personal to the 
offender. The following factors can reduce a penalty: 
 prior clean record, except in relation to offenses 
against children; and 100 
 military service.101 
It is unclear why military service should be singled out 
as a mitigating consideration. While this is incontestably a 
desirable activity, it is not manifestly more virtuous than 
charity work or service as a nurse or other health 
professional. 
There are a number of considerations that can mitigate 
because of the impact of the sanction on the offender. They 
are: 
 age;102 
 mental and emotional condition;103 and/or 
 physical condition.104 
  
[t]he defendant’s decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense 
or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure 
may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead 
guilty or to enter into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based 
on justifiable, non-prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is 
recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the 
court. 
 100. Id. § 5K2.20(a)-(b). 
 101. Id. § 5H1.11. 
 102. Id. § 5H1.1. For a discussion of this consideration factor being mitigatory, 
see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 50-66. 
 103. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.3. For a discussion of this 
consideration see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 70-84.   
 104. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.4. For a discussion of this 
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 84-106.  
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As discussed below, these factors are sound to the extent 
that they relate to the harshness with which the sanction 
impacts on the offender. 
Factors in this category but expressly stipulated as not 
being mitigatory are: 
 drug or alcohol dependence or abuse and gambling 
addiction;105 
 employment record;106 
 family ties and responsibilities;107 
 race;108 
 sex;109 
 national origin;110 
 creed;111 
 religion;112 
 socio-economic status;113 
 civic, charitable, or public service; employment-
related contributions;114 
  
 105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.4. For an argument in favor 
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 95-
102, 104-05. 
 106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.5. For an argument in favor 
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 
106-09. 
 107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.6. For an argument in favor 
of these factors being mitigatory, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 
109-17.  
 108. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.10. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. For a discussion of this consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra 
note 13, at 124-27 
 114. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.11. For a discussion of this 
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 127-39.  
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 record of prior good works;115 and  
 lack of guidance as a youth and similar 
circumstances.116 
While the Guidelines stipulate that these factors should not 
reduce a penalty, post-Booker this is not an obligatory 
stipulation and, where relevant, judges can mitigate a 
penalty for these reasons.117 As noted above, this list of 
departures is not exhaustive. The Guidelines expressly state: 
“The Commission recognizes that there may be other grounds 
for departure that are not mentioned; it also believes there 
may be cases in which a departure outside suggested levels 
is warranted. In its view, however, such cases will be highly 
infrequent.”118 
Moreover, while in theory the express stipulation that 
these factors should not mitigate is, in principle, desirable for 
the purposes of clarity, the negation of several of these factors 
as being capable of reducing penalty is questionable. In 
particular, as is discussed in Parts VI to IX below, a sound 
case can be made for socio-economic status and family ties to 
mitigate. 
B. Aggravation and Mitigation in Australia 
In Australia, the situation is more expansive as far as the 
number of aggravating and mitigating considerations is 
concerned. Sentencing in each of the nine Australian 
jurisdictions (i.e., the six states, the Northern Territory, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Federal jurisdiction) is 
governed by a combination of legislation and the common 
law. While sentencing law differs in each Australian 
jurisdiction, considerable convergence exists in key areas. 
For the purposes of this Article, the important point 
regarding sentencing in Australia is that it is largely a 
  
 115. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.11. For a discussion of this 
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 127-39. 
 116. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 5H1.12. For a discussion of this 
consideration, see Baron-Evans & Coffin, supra note 13, at 139-47.  
 117. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364-65 (2007) (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 118. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 1A1.4(b).  
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discretionary process, in which judges process potentially 
hundreds of aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
In contrast to the United States, fixed penalties for 
serious offenses in Australia are rare.119 However, the over-
arching methodology and conceptual approach that 
sentencing judges undertake in making sentencing decisions 
is the same in each jurisdiction. This approach is known as 
“instinctive synthesis.” The term originates from the forty 
year-old Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria decision 
of R v Williscroft.120 Justices Adam and Crockett stated: “Now, 
ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing 
judge’s instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects 
involved in the punitive process.”121 
The process of instinctive synthesis is a mechanism 
whereby sentencers make a decision regarding all the 
considerations relevant to sentencing and give due weight to 
each of them (and, in the process, incorporate considerations 
that incline to a heavier penalty and off-set against them 
factors that favor a lesser penalty), then set a precise penalty. 
The hallmark of this process is that it does not require (nor 
permit) judges to set out with any particularity122 the weight 
(in mathematical terms) accorded to any particular 
consideration. A global judgment is made without recourse to 
a step-wise process that demarcates the precise 
considerations that influence the judgment. The general 
methodology for reaching sentencing decisions has been 
considered by the High Court of Australia on several 
occasions. The Court has consistently adopted the instinctive 
synthesis approach and rejected the alternative, which is 
normally referred to as the two-step approach, which 
involves setting an appropriate sentence commensurate with 
the severity of the offense and making allowances up and 
  
 119. An example is people smuggling offenses. See, e.g., Migration Act 1958 
(Cth), ss 233A–233C (Austl.). 
 120. R. v Williscroft [1975] VR 292. 
 121. Id. at 300.  
 122. With minor exceptions discussed in Part IV below. 
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down in light of relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.123 
The proportionality principle is adopted in all 
jurisdictions. In Veen (No 1) v R124 and Veen (No 2) v R125 the 
High Court stated that proportionality is the primary aim of 
sentencing. It is considered so important that it cannot be 
trumped even by the goal of community protection which, at 
various times, has also been declared as the most important 
aim of sentencing.126 
Another important commonality in all Australian 
jurisdictions is that aggravating and mitigating factors 
operate relatively uniformly throughout the country, despite 
the different ways in which they are dealt with by statute. 
The considerations stem mainly from the common law and 
are continually evolving. There are between 200 and 300 
such factors.127 The large number of aggravating and 
mitigating factors is a key reason why it is not possible to 
predict with confidence the exact sentence that will be 
imposed in any particular case.128 The unfettered 
discretionary nature of Australian sentencing calculus is 
similar to the largely uncontrolled sentencing process in 
parts of the United States approximately fifty years ago, 
which led Justice Marvel Frankel to describe the system as 
“lawless.”129 
  
 123. See, e.g., Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, 28 (Austl.). 
 124. Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467. 
 125. See generally Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 (discussing all 
factors properly considered to reach a proportionate sentence). 
 126. See, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433, 438.  
 127. See, e.g., Roger Douglas, Sentencing, in GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF 
VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 62 (1980), in a study of Victorian Magistrates’ 
Courts, identified 292 relevant sentencing factors. 
 128. A similar regime exists in the United Kingdom. See generally Ashworth, 
Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigating at Sentencing, 
supra note 11, at 21-38. 
 129. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 48 (1972). 
For a critique of Frankel’s impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin 
Frankel’s Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKLEY J. 
CRIM. L. 239, 254-57 (2009). 
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Like the situation in the United States, there is no 
established or accepted theory of what should constitute 
mitigating and aggravating consideration. Most of these 
factors are defined by the common law, and some legislative 
schemes set out a number of mitigating and aggravating 
considerations. The most expansive scheme to this end, is 
that in New South Wales pursuant to section 21A(2) of the 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.130 The list here 
provides a useful comparison to those in the U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.131 Broadly, the considerations can be 
divided into the same categories as those discussed in the 
United States context. 
I again consider aggravating factors first. The offender’s 
prior criminality is, once again, an aggravating factor, and it 
is expressly stated that it is especially the case in relation to 
serious personal violence offenses.132 
The first broad category of aggravation is the manner in 
which the offense is committed. A crime is made more serious 
if it involves any of the nineteen following aspects: 
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use 
of violence;133  
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use 
of a weapon;134 
 the offense involved the actual or threatened use 
of explosives or a chemical or biological agent;135  
 the offense was committed in company;136  
 the offense was committed in the presence of a 
child under 18 years of age;137 
  
 130. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, (NSW) s 21A(2)(d) (Austl.). 
 131. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40. 
 132. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, supra note 130, s 21A(2)(d). 
 133. Id. s 21A(2)(b). 
 134. Id. s 21A(2)(c). 
 135. Id. s 21A(2)(ca). 
 136. Id. s 21A(2)(e). 
 137. Id. s 21A(2)(ea). 
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 the offense involved the offender causing the 
victim to take, inhale or be affected by a narcotic 
drug, alcohol or any other intoxicating 
substance;138  
 the offense was committed in the home of the 
victim or any other person;139 
 the offense involved gratuitous cruelty;140  
 the offense was motivated by prejudicial hate;141 
 the offense was committed without regard to 
public safety;142 
 the offense involved a risk to national security;143 
 the offense involved a grave risk of death to 
another person;144 
 the offense was committed while the offender was 
on conditional liberty;145 
 the offender abused a position of trust or authority 
in relation to the victim;146 
 the offense involved multiple victims or a series of 
criminal acts;147 
 the offense was committed for financial gain;148 
 the offense was a traffic offense and was 
committed with a passenger under sixteen years 
of age;149 
  
 138. Id. s 21A(2)(cb). 
 139. Id. s 21A(2)(eb). 
 140. Id. s 21A(2)(f). 
 141. Id. s 21A(2)(h). 
 142. Id. s 21A(2)(i). 
 143. Id. s 21A(2)(ia). 
 144. Id. s 21A(2)(ib). 
 145. Id. s 21A(2)(j). 
 146. Id. s 21A(2)(k). 
 147. Id. s 21A(2)(m). 
 148. Id. s 21A(2)(o). 
 149. Id. s 21A(2)(p). 
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 the offense was planned;150 or 
 the offense was committed in the course of 
organized criminal activity.151 
There are two aggravating factors relating to the victim, 
namely: 
 the victim was a public official;152 and  
 the victim was vulnerable. 153 
The outcome of the offense can also be aggravating;154 
however, no such considerations are set out in the legislation. 
Unlike the situation in the United States, there are 
roughly the same number of mitigating considerations as 
aggravating factors in Australia. The first mitigating 
category relates to the circumstances of the offense. In effect, 
these considerations relate to situations which are grounded 
in criminal defenses but were not so extreme as to exculpate 
the offender. The considerations are: 
 the offender was provoked by the victim;155  
 the offender was acting under duress;156 and  
 the offender was not fully aware of the 
consequences of his or her actions because of the 
offender’s age or any disability. 157 
The second mitigating category is the offender’s response 
to the charge. Thus, the following considerations will reduce 
penalty: 
 remorse shown by the offender;158 
  
 150. Id. s 21A(2)(n). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. s 21A(2)(a). 
 153. Id. s 21A(2)(l). 
 154. MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA 231-36 (2013) 
[hereinafter BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA].  
 155. Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 21A(3)(c). 
 156. Id. s 21A(3)(d). 
 157. Id. s 21A(3)(j). 
 158. Id. s 21A(3)(i). 
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 a plea of guilty;159 
 meaningful pre-trial disclosure (which attenuates 
the duration of any trial); 160 and 
 assistance to law enforcement authorities. 161 
Another category is matters personal to the offender. The 
following factors can reduce penalty: 
 the offender does not have significant previous 
convictions;162  
 the offender was a person of good character;163 
 the offender is unlikely to re-offend;164 or 
 the offender has good prospects of rehabilitation.165 
Unlike the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
there is greater alignment between aggravating and 
mitigating factors. In some cases, the absence of an 
aggravating factor is mitigating. Thus, mitigation is 
warranted where: 
 the injury, emotional harm, loss, or damage 
caused by the offense was not substantial;166 and 
 the offense was not part of a planned or organized 
criminal activity.167 
The factors, while relatively extensive, do not come close 
to exhausting the range of mitigating and aggravating 
considerations. Other mitigating factors include: voluntary 
cessation of offending;168 voluntary disclosure of crime;169 
  
 159. Id. s 21A(3)(k). 
 160. Id. s 21A(3)(l). 
 161. Id. s 21A(3)(m). 
 162. Id. s 21A(3)(e). 
 163. Id. s 21A(3)(f). 
 164. Id. s 21A(3)(g). 
 165. Id. s 21A(3)(h). 
 166. Id. s 21A(3)(a). 
 167. Id. s 21A(3)(b). 
 168. R v Pickett [2010] NSWCCA 273 (Austl.). 
 169. DPC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 395 (Austl.). 
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onerous prison conditions related to the personal factors of 
the offender (e.g., nature of the offense and mental 
condition);170 poor health;171 and public opprobrium directed 
towards the offender as a result of the offense.172 Additional 
aggravating considerations are: being part of a gang;173 
committing a well-planned offense;174 and committing a crime 
which is prevalent.175 
Moreover, the list of aggravating and mitigating 
considerations in Australia is never closed. It is constantly 
developing as more are continually added to the list, and 
often there is a lack of clarity regarding the status of 
emerging considerations. A few examples illustrate the point. 
Offenders who are not Australian citizens risk deportation if 
they fail a “character test”, which occurs, among other 
circumstances, if a person is sentenced to imprisonment for a 
year or more.176 Deportation is an additional burden that 
would be faced by the offender and hence, arguably, it should 
be mitigatory. That was the position taken in 
Valayamkandathil v The Queen;177 Guden v The Queen178 and 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Yildirim.179 However, a 
different position was taken in Ponniah v The Queen.180 
  
 170. Tognolini v The Queen [2012] (No. 2) VSCA 311 (Austl.); see also R v Puc 
[2008] VSCA 159 (Austl.); Western Australia v O’Kane [2011] WASCA 24. 
 171. Dosen v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 283 (Austl.); AWP v The Queen [2012] 
VSCA 41 (Austl.). 
 172. Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 267 (Austl.)  
 173. R v Quin [2009] NSWCCA 16 (Austl.). 
 174. R v Yildiz [2006] 160 A Crim R 218 (Austl.); R v Douglas [2004] 146 A Crim 
R 590 (Austl.). 
 175. Braslin v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1 (Austl.). For recent discussions 
about key mitigating factors, see BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA, 
supra note 154, at 273-75, 310-51.  
 176. Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501; JOHN VRACHNAS ET AL., MIGRATION AND 
REFUGEE LAW 160 (3d ed., 2012).  
 177. [2010] VSCA 260 [28] (Austl.). 
 178. [2010] VSCA 196 [29] (Austl.). 
 179. [2011] VSCA 219 (Austl.). 
 180. [2011] WASCA 105 [48] (Austl.). 
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In Victoria, it has been held that the consent of a child 
sex victim does not mitigate a penalty in relation to child sex 
cases.181 A different approach is taken in Western 
Australia.182 
In Avdic v The Queen the Victorian Court of Appeal held 
that an offender who was pregnant at the time of sentence 
with her first child was not entitled to a sentencing discount 
on account of the fact that she would be required to raise the 
child in the prison setting.183 To this end, the Court simply 
stated: 
The evidence on the plea was that she would be accommodated in a 
special unit for mothers of young children. I am not satisfied that 
the evidence before the sentencing judge demonstrated that her 
pregnancy would render imprisonment more burdensome than for 
other prisoners. This is not a case where the appellant will be 
separated from her child by reason of imprisonment.184 
In Hancock v The Queen the same Court recognized that 
pregnancy could be a mitigating factor.185 The decisions are 
barely a year apart. In Hancock there is no reference to Avdic, 
underlining the lack of rigor in this area of law.186 
C. Overview of Comparison of Aggravation and Mitigation 
in the United States and Australia 
The above discussion highlights the range and, in the 
case of Australia, the near limitless number of considerations 
that aggravate and mitigate penalty. There is some overlap 
in relation to these considerations; however, the 
dissimilarities are profound and at several different levels. 
The first is the contrast in the type of considerations that 
impact sentence. The prominent considerations in Australia 
that affect sentence which are not recognized in the United 
  
 181. Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157 (Austl.). 
 182. R v SJH [2010] WASCA 40 (Austl.). 
 183. [2012] VSCA 172 [21] (Austl.). 
 184. [2012] VSCA 172, [21] (Austl.). 
 185. [2013] VSCA 199 (Austl.). 
 186. Id. 
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States include: burdensome prison conditions; a significant 
delay between the time of charging and sentence;187 
incidental hardships stemming from the crime, such as 
public opprobrium;188 an injury sustained while committing 
the offense;189 forgiveness of the victim;190 and pleading guilty 
(even when not associated with remorse). 
The contrast is so stark in some cases that considerations 
which positively mitigate penalty in Australia are expressly 
repudiated as being capable of reducing penalty in the United 
States. Examples of this relate to social and economic 
deprivation, the cultural background of the offender,191 and 
the impact of the sentence on the offender’s family. The 
converse is also true—using a domain name to commit an 
offense or previous military service are not recognized 
sentencing factors in Australia. 
The second dissimilarity is not so obvious, but is perhaps 
more significant. While there is a degree of overlap between 
some of the sentencing considerations, the weight accorded 
to them and, hence, their capacity to impact sentence is 
profoundly different. A clear illustration of this relates to 
prior convictions. As noted above, in the United States they 
can drastically increase penalty severity—by over a decade.192 
However, in Australia, prior convictions are only relevant to 
the extent of denying an offender a discount that would be 
associated with prior good behavior and, hence, cannot be 
used as the basis for increasing a penalty above that which is 
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.193 Other 
examples include discounts associated with pleading guilty 
and assisting authorities. In Australia, they are generally 
  
 187. R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517, 522 (Austl.). 
 188. Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 267 (Austl.). 
 189. R v Hannigan [2009] 193 A Crim R 399 (Austl.). 
 190. Marsh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 6 (Austl.). 
 191. See e.g., Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 (Austl.). 
 192. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior 
Convictions of the Person that Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact 
Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343 
[hereinafter Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime]. 
 193. R v Baumer [1988] 166 CLR 51, 58 (Austl.). 
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regarded as the most compelling sentencing considerations 
and can lead to discounts in the order of twenty-five percent 
and fifty percent, respectively.194 By contrast, in the United 
States, they are given far less weight. In Australia, as a 
general rule, the impact of aggravating and mitigating 
considerations is far more discretionary and unpredictable 
than in the United States. Apart from the discounts for 
pleading guilty and assisting authorities, the courts do not 
specify the weight accorded to any aggravating or mitigating 
considerations. That is a matter for the judge and hence any 
consideration can be given, say, 5% or 40% emphasis without 
the judge falling into error. 
There are, of course, differences to be expected when 
comparing any sentencing systems. Sentencing is a complex 
dynamic which is deeply influenced by political, social, 
cultural and economic situations. However, the United 
States and Australia are flourishing, wealthy, highly-
educated countries with the capacity to make informed, 
intelligent and evidence-based public policy decisions. 
Moreover, the systems of both countries have the same 
fundamental aims: to reduce crime, impose proportionate 
penalties and achieve the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation 
and incapacitation. Thus, a degree of convergence in relation 
to fundamental sentencing considerations would be expected. 
It does not exist, however, in relation to aggravating and 
mitigating considerations because of the absence of doctrinal 
coherency in this area. The remainder of this Article 
attempts to remedy the existing intellectual and policy 
deficit. 
III. CURRENT METHODOLOGY REGARDING AGGRAVATING AND 
MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS IS FLAWED 
The jurisprudence on the explanation and justification of 
aggravating and mitigating factors is sparse and weak. There 
are few cases or commentaries that attempt anything 
approaching a detailed or serious evaluation of the nature or 
meaning of aggravating or mitigating factors. Typically, 
  
 194. BAGARIC & EDNEY, SENTENCING IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 154, at 287-95, 
304-10.  
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when judges apply such considerations, they assume their 
existence and when the concepts are discussed in a wider 
context they are done so in a perfunctory manner.195 
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has not 
developed an over-arching theory of mitigation. To the extent 
that it has considered these concepts, the emphasis has been 
on mitigation and, to this end, it has mainly been in relation 
to capital cases.196 The concept has been applied in a broad 
manner (without any attempt to define the term).197 For 
example, in Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice O’Connor simply 
stated that mitigating factors are considerations which 
reduce the culpability of a defendant.198 
In a similar vein are the comments of Justice Basten in 
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal decision of 
Elyard v R, where he stated: 
Terms such as “aggravating factors” and “mitigating factors”, have 
a long history of use in this area of the law. Depending on context, 
usage may vary, but one common intention is to identify those 
circumstances which may tend to place a particular offense towards 
the upper or lower ends of a range of moral culpability.199 
One of the few cases that examined the concept of 
aggravation or mitigation in any detail is the Director of 
Public Prosecutions v England.200 The offender pleaded guilty 
to murder in circumstances where, after the killing, he 
  
 195. See Ashworth, Re-evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and 
Mitigating at Sentencing, supra note 11, at 27-28; ALLAN MASON, The Search for 
Principles: Integrating Cultural Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT 
SENTENCING 40, 40-43 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011). 
 196. See Jeffrey L Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The 
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346-48 (1998). 
 197. This is reflected in the comment by Justice O’Connor in California v. 
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987). 
 198. 492 U.S. 302, 337-38 (1989); see also Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-608 
(1978) (noting that relevant mitigating factors must be considered to meet 
constitutional requirements for death penalty statutes).  
 199. [2006] NSWCCA 43 [4] (Austl.). 
 200. [1999] 2 VR 258 (Austl.). The decision was relied upon in R v Quarry [2005] 
11 VR 337, 346 per Batt JA (Austl.). 
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defiled the body.201 On appeal, a central matter for the 
Victorian Court of Appeal was whether the post-offense 
conduct could be an aggravating factor.202 
In resolving the issue, Justice Brooking first noted that, 
“aggravating circumstances point towards greater severity of 
sentence.”203 The complexity in this case was that the 
aggravating conduct had occurred after the offense had been 
completed. To justify this conduct as an independent 
aggravating factor, Justice Brooking relied upon the notion 
of a “common sense” or “moral sense.” His Honor held:  
Long before the Sentencing Act rose above the horizon judges drew 
on their common sense and their moral sense, as representing that 
of the community, in deciding what things about a crime could be 
said to make it more or less serious.204 They still do; nothing in the 
Act stops them from doing this. Common sense and moral sense, 
which are and must ever be the essential foundation of sentencing 
principles and practices, unite in rejecting the notion that “the 
circumstances of the offense”, for sentencing purposes, are neatly 
marked out by two lines, one at the technical beginning and the 
other at the technical end of the crime.205 
This approach is singularly unhelpful. In a system 
governed by rules, standards developed on the basis of 
common sense or (an undisclosed) moral sense are repugnant 
to basal rule of law virtues.206 
Thus, the Courts have provided little doctrinal guidance 
regarding the concept of mitigation or aggravation. The same 
  
 201. Director of Public Prosecutions [1999] 2 VR 258. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. A similar approach to that of Justice Brooking in Director of Public 
Prosecutions, which also relied upon “common sense,” was evident in R v Basso 
[1999] 108 A Crim R 392 [24 (Austl.), where Justice Chernov opined that in 
respect of offenses committed while on bail: “In my view, as a matter of common 
sense, the commission of an offense in breach of such a condition constitutes an 
aggravating factor, which can be taken into account by the sentencing judge in 
determining the appropriate sentence.” 
 204. Basso [1999] 108 A Crim R 392 [23]. 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. See JOEL FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-76 (1980); JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 210-29 (1979). 
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applies in relation to scholarly works. In relation to 
mitigating factors, Hyman Gross207 has noted that: 
It is no easy matter to decide what shall count as a good reason in 
mitigation of sentence [in fairness to him, what a man has done 
that rebounds to his credit ought sometimes to be admitted to 
counterbalance the crime that now rebounds to his 
discredit] . . . Because we are civilized . . . our moral life includes 
many different sorts of things, and in meting out punishment for 
crime we need to go beyond the simple justice of desert and show 
respect as well for other things of value. 
In the first place there are sometimes larger considerations of 
justice whose influence makes itself felt. . . . The acts of a good 
citizen and even a virtuous human being often have a proper place 
and count in his favour in deciding on his sentence. Still, not every 
kind of creditable activity is properly taken into account or 
consideration and we find it difficult to decide where to draw the 
line. 
Apart from justice there is mercy. . . . Sometimes compassion is not 
a matter of mercy but a matter of right. When suffering would be 
cruel, the sentence must be mitigated to prevent that. . . . Finally, 
there are reasons of expediency that seem to warrant mitigation. 
We wish to encourage those apprehended to cooperate in bringing 
others to justice, and so we reward their co-operation with lighter 
sentences than they would otherwise receive.208 
The problem with this approach is that it is too obscure. 
Reliance on broad and obscure concepts such as “fairness”, 
“virtue”, “mercy”, and “justice” provides no scope for guidance 
in distinguishing considerations which are genuinely 
mitigatory (or aggravating) from those which are not. 
IV. TOWARDS A RATIONAL THEORY 
In order to understand the scope and nature of 
aggravating and mitigating considerations, it is necessary to 
develop a top-down theory.209 
  
 207. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 451-52 (1978). 
 208. Id. 
 209. The most informative examination of this issue is by Ashworth, Re-
evaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigating at Sentencing, supra 
note 11, at 21; however, his discussion focuses on the extent to which existing 
aggravating and mitigating factors fit within current orthodoxy as opposed to 
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As noted above, according to existing orthodoxy, 
considerations which lower a penalty can be divided into four 
categories: the circumstances of the offense; the offender’s 
response to a charge; matters personal to the offender; and 
the impact of the sanction on the offender and his or her 
dependents. As far as factors that increase penalty, the 
categories are: the offender’s criminal history; the manner in 
which the offense was committed; the nature of the victim; 
and the outcome of the offense.210  
While that is the conventional manner in which 
aggravating and mitigating considerations are categorized, it 
stems from a desire for expediency rather than an approach 
derived from conceptual interrogation. The existing 
classifications provide a neat and orderly methodology for 
lawyers and judges who need to identify and catalogue 
established aggravating and mitigating considerations; 
however, they do not give any insight into the possible 
rationale and foundation for the considerations. 
The more illuminating pathway to explaining and 
justifying aggravating and mitigating considerations is to 
place them in the multi-dimensional institutional construct 
within which they operate. In terms of the increasing breadth 
of operation, there are three such institutions. The first is the 
sentencing system. This system does not exist in a vacuum 
and is subsumed within the broader system of criminal 
justice and the over-arching system of law and justice. Hence, 
the second perspective is the criminal justice system, and the 
third is the legal system in general. As we shall see, the 
objectives of these systems are not always identical. 
The starting point in grounding aggravating and 
mitigating considerations is that they should be abolished 
unless a cogent justification is given in light of the objectives 
of these three institutions. I commence this inquiry by 
focusing on the sentencing system. 
  
whether they are justifiable against the backdrop of an over-arching coherent 
theory. 
 210. See supra Part II.A. 
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V. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING FROM 
THE SENTENCING SYSTEM 
The most narrow reference point in developing 
aggravating and mitigating factors is the sentencing system. 
From this perspective a consideration should only operate to 
increase or decrease penalty if it promotes a sentencing 
objective which itself is justified. In order to ascertain which 
sentencing aims are valid, it is necessary to contextualize the 
analysis against a slightly broader doctrinal backdrop. 
Punishment is a study of the connection between wrongdoing 
and state-imposed sanctions. The main issue raised by the 
concept of punishment is the basis upon which the evils 
administered by the state to offenders can be justified. Thus, 
sentencing and punishment are inextricably linked, with 
punishment being the logically prior inquiry. In order to 
properly decide how, and how much, to punish, it must first 
be established on what basis punishment is justified and why 
we are punishing.211 
A. Both Theories of Punishment Incline to the Same 
Sentencing Objectives 
As noted earlier, there are two main theories of 
punishment.212 Utilitarians argue that punishment is 
justified because the pain stemming from the sanction is 
outweighed by the good consequences stemming from it.213 
The consequences are traditionally thought to come in the 
form of incapacitation (i.e., imprisoning offenders and 
thereby preventing them from further offending), deterrence 
(i.e., discouraging further offending), and rehabilitation (i.e., 
inducing positive attitudinal reform).214 The utilitarian 
  
 211. See HERBERT L. PACKER, Theories of Punishment and Correction: What is 
the Function of Prison?, in JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL 
PROCESS 183, 183-89 (Leonard Orland ed., 1973). 
 212. See supra Part I.  
 213. MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 43 
(2001) [hereinafter BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING]. 
 214. See Mirko Bagaric and Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 
supra note 2, at 134-39. 
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theory of punishment has fallen out of favor for two main 
reasons. The first is the perceived inability of the sentencing 
process to achieve the utilitarian penal objectives of 
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.215 The second 
is the view that utilitarianism could lead to abhorrent 
practices, such as punishing the innocent.216 
The main competing theory, and the one which enjoys the 
most contemporary support, is retributivism. Retributive 
theories of punishment are not clearly defined and it is 
difficult to isolate a common thread running through theories 
carrying this label.217 All retributive theories assert that 
offenders deserve to suffer, and that the institution of 
punishment should inflict the suffering they deserve. 
However, they provide divergent accounts of why criminals 
deserve to suffer.218 
While retributivism is the orthodox theory of 
punishment, I have previously argued that it is doctrinally 
flawed principally because it can only justify punishment by 
reference to consequential benefits stemming from 
punishment, mainly in the form of deterring crime.219 I have 
also argued that the criticisms of a utilitarian theory of 
punishment have been over-stated and that, in fact, 
utilitarianism is the most persuasive theory of 
punishment.220 
Irrespective of which theory is the most sound, it is 
important to note that the practical implications from each of 
the theories are theoretically not as significant as may seem 
to be the case. As a result of the empirical data regarding the 
efficacy of punishment to achieve stated utilitarian objectives 
  
 215. See A.E. BOTTOMS, An Introduction to the Coming Crisis, in THE COMING 
PENAL CRISIS: A CRIMINOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION 8-15 (A.E. 
Bottoms & R.H. Preston eds., 1980). 
 216. See EDGAR FREDERICK CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947); 
HENRY JOHN MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 181 (1969).  
 217. See HONDERICH, supra note 17, at 211; David Dolinko, Retributivism, 
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHILOSOPHY 
507, 515 (1997). 
 218. See Anthony Duff & Andrew Von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and 
the “Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103, 107 (1997). 
 219. See BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING, supra note 213, at 158.  
 220. Id.  
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of punishment, it emerges that, in fact, there is no 
meaningful pragmatic difference between retributivism and 
utilitarianism so far as the design of a rational sentencing 
system is concerned. As noted below, the key focus of 
retributivism is to ensure there is proportionality between 
the punishment and the crime. Such matching is potentially 
distorted in a utilitarian calculus by the need to achieve other 
objectives, namely, general deterrence, specific deterrence, 
and rehabilitation. However, as is noted shortly, punishment 
is largely incapable of achieving these objectives and hence 
the amount of punishment should not be influenced by those 
considerations. Both theories endorse the pursuit of 
proportionate sentences as a principle sentencing 
requirement.221 The potential theoretical divergence between 
the key theories of punishment has been negated by what the 
empirical data show can be achieved through sentencing. 
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to explore this philosophical 
realm further for the purposes of this Article. 
The overlap between the retributive and utilitarian aims 
was noted by the United States Federal Sentencing 
Commission, which stated: 
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to 
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal 
punishment. Most observers of the criminal law agree that the 
ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is 
the control of crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus 
seems to break down. Some argue that appropriate punishment 
should be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of “just 
deserts.” Under this principle, punishment should be scaled to the 
offender’s culpability and the resulting harms. Others argue that 
punishment should be imposed primarily on the basis of practical 
“crime control” considerations. This theory [utilitarianism] calls for 
sentences that most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime, 
either by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant. 
Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to 
choose between them and accord one primacy over the other. As a 
practical matter, however, this choice was unnecessary because in 
  
 221. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in 
Sentencing, 25 N.Z.U.L. REV. 411, 419, 423-24 (2013) [hereinafter Bagaric, 
Injecting Content]. 
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most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will 
produce the same or similar results.222 
B. The Objectives of Punishment Do Not Have a Significant 
Impact on the Development of Aggravating and 
Mitigating Factors 
While the choice of punishment theory does not impact 
heavily on the selection of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, the decision regarding which objectives of sentencing 
to pursue can potentially strongly influence the development 
of such factors. For example, if rehabilitation is a valid aim 
of sentencing, considerations such as youth and remorse 
could reduce penalty severity.223 In order to ascertain the 
appropriateness of established sentencing objectives to guide 
the sentencing landscape, it is necessary to determine the 
validity of these objectives. 
There is a mass of empirical data focusing on the efficacy 
of sentencing to achieve the main goals of sentencing. 
Fortunately, the trend of the findings has been analyzed 
recently and is relatively consistent, hence it is possible to 
provide an overview of conclusions in the recent literature. In 
short, current empirical evidence provides no basis for 
confidence that sentencing is capable of achieving most of the 
goals of sentencing and hence they should not drive the 
selection of aggravating and mitigating considerations.224 The 
one exception to this is the incapacitation of serious sexual 
and violent offenders. I now consider each of the objectives 
more closely. 
  
 222. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. (2013). 
 223. This, of course, assumes that younger offenders and those who are contrite 
are less likely to re-offend. 
 224. See generally Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing, 
supra note 14.  
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1. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work. Specific deterrence 
aims to reduce the incidence of crime by punishing offenders 
and thereby illustrating to them the negative effects of 
crime.225 It is assumed that this experience will be so adverse 
that they will seek to avoid it in the future.226 The available 
empirical data suggest that specific deterrence does not 
work, so inflicting less severe sanctions on offenders than 
imprisonment will not make them more likely to re-offend in 
the future. The level of certainty of this conclusion is very 
high, so high that specific deterrence should be abolished as 
a sentencing consideration so it cannot influence the 
development of aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
There are numerous studies across a wide range of 
jurisdictions and different time periods that have come to 
this conclusion.227 Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen and 
Cheryl L. Jonson provide the most recent extensive literature 
review regarding specific deterrence.228 They reviewed the 
impact of custodial sanctions versus non-custodial sanctions 
and the effect of sentence length on re-offending.229 The 
review examined six experimental studies where custodial 
versus non-custodial sentences were randomly assigned;230 
eleven studies which involved matched pairs;231 thirty-one 
studies which were regression based;232 and seven other 
studies which did not neatly fit into any of those three 
  
 225. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to 
Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, 
Rehabilitation Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159, 159 
(2012). 
 226. Id.  
 227. See id. 
 228. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Re-offending, 38 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 143-77 (2009); see also DONALD RITCHIE, 
SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF THE 
EVIDENCE (2011); DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE 
SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE RE-
OFFENDING (2009). 
 229. Nagin et al., supra note 226, at 143. 
 230. Id. at 144-47. 
 231. Id. at 145, 148-53. 
 232. Id. at 154-62. 
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categories and included naturally occurring social 
experiments which allowed inferences to be drawn regarding 
the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.233 
Nagin et al. suggest that offenders who are sentenced to 
imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than 
those who receive a non-custodial penalty and, in fact, that 
some studies show the rate of recidivism among offenders 
sentenced to imprisonment to be higher. They conclude that:  
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies 
point more toward a criminogenic [that is, the possible corrupting 
effects of punishment] rather than preventive effect of custodial 
sanctions. The evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak 
because it is based on only a small number of studies, and many of 
the point estimates are not statistically significant.234 
Recent studies are consistent with this conclusion.235 
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that 
subjecting offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to 
increase the prospect that they will become law-abiding 
citizens in the future. It follows that the goal of specific 
deterrence cannot be achieved by the imposition of criminal 
sanctions and should not influence sentencing practice and, 
in particular, the choice of aggravating factors. It is futile to 
increase penalties with the aim of decreasing the likelihood 
that offenders will re-offend in the future—any aggravating 
factors based on this objective should be abolished. In 
particular, it is commonly regarded that offenders with 
criminal histories should receive increasingly heavier 
penalties in order to emphasize with greater force that crime 
is inappropriate. The empirical evidence debunks this 
approach. 
  
 233. Id. at 155, 163-67. 
 234. Id. at 145. 
 235. See Donald P. Green and Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments 
to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug 
Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 357-58 (2010); see also FRANKLIN ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 245 (1973) 
[hereinafter ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL]. 
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2. General Deterrence (Also) Does Not Work. The main 
form of deterrence used to justify harsher penalties is general 
deterrence. General deterrence seeks to dissuade potential 
offenders from committing similar offenses with the threat of 
anticipated punishment by illustrating the harsh 
consequences of offending.236 
There are two forms of general deterrence. Marginal 
general deterrence concerns the correlation between the 
severity of the sanction and the prevalence of an offense.237 It 
is a commonly-invoked objective used to justify heavier 
sanctions being invoked, especially for crimes that are 
planned and have a profit motive, such as drug trafficking 
and white collar offending.238 Absolute general deterrence 
concerns the threshold question of whether there is any 
connection between criminal sanctions, of whatever nature, 
and the incidence of criminal conduct.239 The evidence 
suggests that marginal deterrence does not work, while 
absolute general deterrence does work.240 
The findings regarding general deterrence are relatively 
settled.241 The existing data show that in the absence of the 
threat of punishment for criminal conduct, the social fabric 
of society would readily dissipate; crime would escalate and 
overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of people to lead 
happy and fulfilled lives. Thus, general deterrence works in 
the absolute sense: there is a connection between criminal 
sanctions and criminal conduct. However, there is 
insufficient evidence to support a direct correlation between 
higher penalties and a reduction in the crime rate.242 It 
  
 236. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL, supra note 235. 
 237. See Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence 
Doesn’t Work—and What it Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269, 270 (2011) 
[hereinafter Bagaric & Alexander, General Deterrence Doesn’t Work]. 
 238. Id. at 271. 
 239. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME 
CONTROL, supra note 235, at 14.  
 240. For an overview of the literature, see RITCHIE, supra note 228. 
 241. For an overview of the literature, see id. 
 242. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60-61, 191 (1969); 
see also Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A 
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follows that marginal deterrence should be disregarded as a 
sentencing objective, at least unless and until there is proof 
that it works.243 
It is counter-intuitive to suggest that higher penalties 
will not reduce the crime rate. However, the evidence is 
relatively definitive. Several reasons have been advanced to 
explain this reality. The most obvious explanation is that the 
risks of hardship and pain occasioned by criminal offending 
are not adequately transmitted to potential offenders.244 In 
other words, there is a failure of “threat communication” as 
it affects risk perception and negatively impacts crime 
rates.245 Yet, studies repeatedly show that awareness of 
potentially severe sanctions does not produce less crime. In 
one of the most wide-ranging studies of its type, 1,500 
respondents in fifty-four large urban countries were 
interviewed to assess whether respondents had higher 
estimates of the certainty and severity of punishment and its 
timeliness (celerity) in jurisdictions where the levels were, in 
  
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569, 569 (2001); John K. 
Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s 
Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dieter Dölling et 
al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of Meta-Analysis of Punishment, 15 EUR. J. 
CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 201, 201 (2009); John J. Donohue III, Assessing the Relative 
Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change over the Previous Decades and the 
Benefits on the Margin, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
OF THE PRISON BOOM 269, 303 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009); 
Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143, 
143 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell 
in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 163, 177-179 (2004); William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and 
Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW 
OF RESEARCH 419, 422 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000); Paul R. Zimmerman, State 
Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 163 
(2004); see generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel 
Wallman eds., 2000). 
 243. See Bagaric & Alexander, General Deterrence Doesn’t Work, supra note 235.  
 244. For a discussion of the obstacles confronting this level of knowledge, see 
Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation 
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003). 
 245. See Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the 
Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 15-19 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
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fact, higher.246 No such link was established.247 The authors of 
the study noted that this is irrespective of whether the 
respondents had prior convictions or no prior experience with 
the criminal justice system.248 They concluded that: 
There is generally no significant association between perceptions of 
punishment levels and actual levels that CJS [criminal justice 
system] agencies work hard to achieve, implying that increases in 
punishment levels do not routinely reduce crime through general 
deterrence mechanisms. Increases in punishment might do so 
through incapacitative effects, the effects of treatment programs 
linked with punishment, or other mechanisms, but are not likely to 
do so in any way that depends on producing changes in perceptions 
of risk. . . . Thus, increased punishment levels are not likely to 
increase deterrent effects, and decreased punishment levels are not 
likely to decrease deterrent effects.249 
A second explanation is that higher sentences do nothing 
to address the underlying causes of criminal behavior. The 
deterrence argument is based on the economic rationalist 
theory of choice; it assumes that offenders rationally choose 
to offend in a type of criminological cost/benefit calculation. 
Of course, sociologists argue that this theory fails to account 
for the myriad reasons that predispose some individuals, and 
some groups, to crime. As Henry observes: 
[M]uch of the criminological literature has demonstrated that there 
are a variety of motivations that shape criminal activity ranging 
from biological predispositions, psychological personality traits, 
social learning, cognitive thinking, geographical location and the 
ecology of place, relative deprivation and the strain of capitalist 
society, political conflict and social and sub-cultural meaning.250 
  
 246. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43 
CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (2005).  
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 654-55. 
 249. Id. at 653-54; see also Christopher Watling et al., Applying Stafford and 
Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence Theory to Drug Driving: Can it Predict 
Those Likely to Offend? 42 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 452, 456-57 
(2010). 
 250. Stuart Henry, Professor and Chair of Interdisciplinary Studies, Coll. of 
Urban, Labor, and Metro. Affairs, Wayne State Univ., On the Effectiveness of 
Prison as Punishment, Paper Presented at the Conference: Incarceration Nation: 
The Warehousing of America’s Poor (Oct. 24, 2003) (emphasis added). 
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In any event, irrespective of the reasons for the failure of 
marginal general deterrence, it follows that penalties should 
not be increased with the aim to deter potential offenders 
from committing crime. 
Thus, deterrence properly informs sentencing only to the 
extent that it requires a hardship to be imposed for criminal 
offending. It does not require a particularly burdensome 
penalty, merely one that people would seek to avoid. That 
aim could be satisfied by a fine or a short prison term. There 
is no foundation for increasing penalties to reduce the crime 
rate. 
3. Rehabilitation—Evidence Not Conclusive Enough to 
Justify Its Pursuit. Unlike the other key sentencing goals 
analyzed above, rehabilitation serves normally to decrease 
rather than increase penalty severity251 and, hence, is a 
mitigating factor. If rehabilitation is a valid objective, 
intuitively, it would justify reducing penalties in 
circumstances where offenders are young, remorseful or have 
taken active and positive steps to overcome the influences 
that underpinned their offending. 
Following extensive research conducted between 1960 
and 1974, Robert Martinson, in an influential paper, 
concluded that empirical studies had not established that 
any rehabilitative programs had worked in reducing 
recidivism.252 The Panel of the National Research Council in 
the United States, several years after this work, also noted 
there were no significant differences between the subsequent 
recidivism rates of offenders regardless of the form of 
punishment.253 They concluded, “[t]his suggests that neither 
rehabilitative nor criminogenic effects operate very 
strongly.”254 
  
 251. This generalization is not necessarily correct. As noted below, it seems that 
rehabilitation programs can, in some instances, be effective in a custodial setting. 
 252. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
 253. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 66 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
 254. Id.  
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The most recent wide-ranging Australian study 
regarding the effectiveness of rehabilitation is a report by 
Karen Heseltine, Andrew Day and Rick Sarre for the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, published in 2011.255 
The report focused on changes and improvements to prison-
based correction rehabilitation programs in the custodial 
environment since 2004, when the previous report was 
issued.256 The report summarized recent cross-jurisdictional 
studies into the effectiveness of certain rehabilitation 
programs.257 It noted that while there were mixed results, 
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes.258 
This was especially the case in relation to sexual offender 
programs, where some studies showed that the recidivism 
rate of offenders completing the program was about half that 
of other offenders.259 The results of programs directed 
towards violent offenders were less positive, but a wide-
ranging review of studies focusing on United Kingdom 
programs noted reductions in violent offenses of around 
seven to eight percent had occurred.260 There is no cogent 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of domestic violence or 
  
 255. KAREN HESELTINE ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, PRISON-BASED 
CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER REHABILITATION PROGRAMS: THE 2009 NATIONAL 
PICTURE IN AUSTRALIA (2011), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/
5/6/4/%7b564B2ECA-4433-4E9B-B4BA-29BD59071E81%7drpp112.pdf; see also 
DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS: REDUCING THE 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS AND DELINQUENTS (2006).  
 256. HESELTINE ET AL., supra note 255, at 2. 
 257. Id. at ix. 
 258. See id. at 14-31. 
 259. See LEON BAKKER ET AL., N.Z. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, AND THERE WAS 
LIGHT . . . EVALUATING THE KIA MARAMA TREATMENT PROGRAMME FOR NEW 
ZEALAND SEX OFFENDERS AGAINST CHILDREN 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/665635/kiamarama.p
df; R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project 
on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL 
ABUSE 169, 169 (2002). 
 260. DARRICK JOLLIFFE & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, A 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS WITH VIOLENT OFFENDERS, at iii (2007), 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100505212400/http://
www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/review-evidence-violent.pdf. 
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victim awareness programs.261 However, drug and alcohol 
programs have been shown to be effective at reducing 
substance abuse and re-offending.262 
This assessment is consistent with the findings of 
Ojmarrh Mitchell, David B. Wilson and Doris L. MacKenzie, 
who undertook a major analysis of studies into the 
effectiveness of drug treatment programs in prison.263 The 
studies they focused on related to drug users and compared 
re-offending patterns of offenders who completed a drug 
rehabilitation program with those who did not complete a 
program, or completed only a minimum program, between 
the years 1980 and 2004.264 They analyzed sixty-six studies 
in total.265 The report concluded, “[o]verall, this meta-analytic 
synthesis of evaluations of incarceration-based drug 
treatment programs found that such programs are modestly 
effective in reducing recidivism.”266 Moreover, it noted that 
programs that dealt with the multiple problems of drug users 
(termed therapeutic communities) were the most successful, 
whereas there was no evidence to support good outcomes 
associated with “boot camp” programs.267 
A mechanism which seems to reduce recidivism is 
undergoing a program of formal education.268 A RAND 
Corporation study published in 2013269 concluded that 
inmates who undertook correctional education programs had 
a thirteen percent reduced risk of recidivating and that this 
  
 261. HESELTINE ET AL., supra note 255, at 22, 30.  
 262. Id. at 26-27. 
 263. OJMARRH MITCHELL ET AL., THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INCARCERATION-BASED DRUG TREATMENT ON CRIMINAL 
BEHAVIOR (2006), available at http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/
download/98. 
 264. Id. at 6. 
 265. Id. at 11.  
 266. Id. at 17. 
 267. Id. at 17-18. 
 268. LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL 
EDUCATION (2013). 
 269. Id.  
1208 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
increased to thirty percent for participants of high 
school/GED programs.270 
Thus, the weight of empirical data (though it is far from 
uniform or consistent) suggests that rehabilitative programs 
can reduce the likelihood of recidivism for certain types of 
offenses, such as sex-offenders. However, the level of 
knowledge regarding the impact of rehabilitative programs 
on recidivism rates is so small that no policy or legal changes 
should be made at this point as far as rehabilitation is 
concerned. 
Accordingly, no practices should be adopted to further 
this rationale. Mitigating factors that are grounded in the 
objective of rehabilitation should be abolished. Rehabilitation 
is a worthwhile social objective. The community should 
continue to invest in programs that facilitate positive 
attitudinal reform in offenders. However, unless there is 
evidence of the success of these programs, the objective of 
rehabilitation needs to be ignored in developing mitigating 
considerations. 
One consideration, in particular, which is impacted by 
this proposal is remorse. It is widely accepted that remorse 
should reduce penalty. However, this should only be the case 
if there is evidence to show that remorseful offenders are less 
likely to re-offend than those who do not feel contrition. No 
such evidence exists. It could be suggested that remorse has 
instrumental benefits extending beyond rehabilitative 
considerations; however, it is not clear this is the case. People 
who commit crime should be contrite: minimum decency 
requires such a response.271 People should not get credit for 
satisfying an expectation. Rather than being mitigating, 
there is an equally strong argument for remorse aggravating 
if it is absent—indeed, that is the position in Delaware.272 
  
 270. Id. at 57. 
 271. Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amaraskera, Feeling Sorry? Tell Someone Who 
Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOW. L.J. 364, 364 (2001). 
 272. DELAWARE SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, BENCHBOOK 123, 125 
(2013). 
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4. Incapacitation—Justified in Relation to Serious Sexual 
and Violent Offenders. Incapacitation aims to protect the 
community by confining offenders to imprisonment during 
which time they can no longer commit offenses. The 
effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be judged by the height 
of the prison wall. Imprisonment as a means of community 
protection is only effective if, but for being imprisoned, the 
offender would have committed a further offense.273 
There are two forms of incapacitation. The first is 
selective incapacitation which focuses on the individual 
offender, and its success is contingent upon distinguishing 
offenders who will re-offend from those who will not.274 Most 
of the research in this area has been directed towards 
predicting which serious offenders will re-offend.275 In this 
regard, the focus has been on offenders who commit violent 
and sexual offenses. 
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data 
regarding the capacity of any discipline to predict future 
criminal behavior noted that predictive techniques “tend to 
invite overestimation of the amount of incapacitation to be 
expected from marginal increments in imprisonment.”276 
More recent actuarial tools have been developed to score 
a person’s level of risk by mapping their profile to variables 
  
 273. See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 14-15 (May 7, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191128 (noting that some incapacitative models 
assume that prison is not part of society); see also Colin Murray, To Punish, Deter 
and Incapacitate: Incarceration and Radicalisation in UK Prisons after 9/11, in 
PRISONS, TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM 16, 18 (Andrew Silke ed., 2013) (noting that 
for incapacitation to work, it is important that inmates do not corrupt other 
prisoners). 
 274. Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 
359, 381 (2003). 
 275. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy that is 
Incapacitation: An Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent 
Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 95, 104-05 (2012) (discussing research 
predicting which serious offenders will re-offend) [hereinafter Bagaric & 
Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation]. 
 276. FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 86 (1995) [hereinafter ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION]. 
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that are known risk factors. Structured professional 
judgment and criminogenic needs tools also use a range of 
variables277 which are designed to be more nuanced than 
actuarial tools because they aim to not only predict the 
likelihood of violence, but also the imminence, severity, and 
possible targets of the risk.278 These more recent attempts to 
accurately predict dangerousness in the context of violent 
and sexual offenses have also proven to be deficient.279 
While selective incapacitation does not work, general 
incapacitation is more effective at reducing crime.280 General 
incapacitation involves imprisoning offenders simply because 
they have committed a criminal offense on the basis that, 
while in prison, they cannot inflict harm in the general 
community.281 Little or no effort is normally made to predict 
future offending patterns, whether on the basis of previous 
criminal history or other considerations. There is no clear 
line between selective and general incapacitation and the 
difference is often simply one of degree. Once large numbers 
  
 277. The LSI-R assessment model, which is used in New South Wales, has fifty-
four variables. See New South Wales Sentencing Council, High-Risk Violent 
Offenders: Sentencing and Post-Custody Management Options at 23 (2012), 
available at http://www.sentencingcouncil.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/
sentencing/documents/pdf/online%20final%20report%20hrvo.pdf. 
 278. For a discussion of these tools, see id. at 20-24. 
 279. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE 107-08 (2009); Jessica 
Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J. 
APPLIED SEC. RES. 317, 322-23 (2011); see also David J. Cook & Christine Michie, 
Violence Risk Assessment: Challenging the Illusion of Certainty, in DANGEROUS 
PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick 
Keyzer eds., 2011). Most recently, it has been suggested that habitual criminals 
and serious offenders have a different brain anatomy compared to other people. 
Neuroimaging of the brain showed that such offenders have less activity in 
certain areas of the brain, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated with self-awareness, learning 
from past experiences and emotions. ADRIAN RAINE, ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE 
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 266-70 (2013). 
 280. For a discussion regarding the distinction between special and collective 
incapacitation see generally ZIMRING & HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION, supra note 
276, at 60-75 (1997) (discussing the distinction between special and collective 
incapacitation). 
 281. Bagaric & Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation, supra note 275. 
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of offenders are imprisoned on the basis of predictive criteria, 
which are inaccurate, a process that may have initially had 
the appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a 
system of general incapacitation. All jurisdictions punish 
recidivists more severely than first time offenders.282 Often 
the extent of the premium is so significant that it has 
effectively evolved into a process of general incapacitation.283 
Most of the research into the testing of the general 
incapacitation model has been undertaken in the United 
States, presumably because of the unprecedented increase in 
the prison population over the past thirty years. The weight 
of evidence supports the view that general incapacitation 
works. 
In the United States between 1993 and 2010: 
(a) the rate of violent victimization rates decreased by 
76%; and  
(b) the decline in total household property crime 
victimization was 64%.284 
During this period, the imprisonment rate rose from 
1.365 million to 2.27 million prisoners.285 At face value, these 
figures suggest a causal link between imprisoning greater 
numbers of offenders and an effective reduction in the crime 
rate. 
William Spelman has calculated that up to 21% of crime 
reduction is attributable to the increased rate of 
  
 282. See Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 192, at 345.  
 283. Id. at 402.  
 284. JANET L. LAURITSEN AND MARIBETH L. REZEY, NCJ241656, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., MEASURING THE PREVALENCE OF CRIME WITH THE NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
mpcncvs.pdf. 
 285. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ156241, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1993 3 (Oct. 1995), available at 
http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.paf (stating the 1.365 
million figure includes inmates in local jails (456,000) and State and Federal 
Prisons (909,000)); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, 3 (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (stating the 2.27 million figure 
also includes inmates in local jails (749,000) and State and Federal Prisons 
(1,518,000)). 
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imprisonment.286 Other studies support the success of 
incapacitation, but remain equally unclear about its precise 
impact. According to literature examined by Roger Warren, a 
ten percent increase in imprisonment rates produces a two to 
four percent reduction in the crime rate; however, most 
relates to non-violent offenses.287 
While general incapacitation seems to have some 
validity, one constant finding is that it is usually most 
effective in relation to minor crime (although some success 
can also be achieved in relation to more serious forms of 
offending).288 This is because minor offenders re-offend more 
frequently than serious offenders. However, while confining 
repeat minor criminals clearly disables them from 
committing further offenses in the community for a period of 
time, it almost certainly does not justify the unrestrained use 
of imprisonment to combat non-serious crime.289 The cost of 
  
 286. See Spelman, supra note 242, at 484-85. 
 287. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of 
Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 
U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009). 
 288. See, e.g., BEN VOLLAARD, TILBURG LAW & ECON. CTR., CENTER, PREVENTING 
CRIME THROUGH SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 34-35 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 
2011-001, CentER Discussion Paper No. 2010-141, Jan. 2011), available at http://
www.papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738900; Don Weatherburn, 
Jiuzhao Hua & Steve Moffatt, How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The 
Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary, 93 NSW CRIME & JUST. BULL. 8-9 
(Jan. 2006), available at http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/
documents/pdf/cjb93.pdf. 
 289. It is notoriously difficult to undertake an accurate cost-benefit analysis of 
imprisonment given the large number of speculative figures involved. See, e.g., 
David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 954 (2012). The variables include the efficacy 
of imprisonment to achieve the goals of general deterrence, specific deterrence 
and incapacitation. Id. at 955-58. The variables associated with the cost of crime 
are even cruder and involve numerous methodologies with no agreed variables. 
Id. Even Abrams concedes that “[f]urther research will make such cost-benefit 
calculations even more useful” and “[m]ore studies that estimate crime costs, 
elasticities, prison costs and other parameters for different regions, age groups, 
and types of crime are needed.” Id. at 969. Abrams further notes that, “[g]oing 
forward, the cost-benefit approach should be expanded to other areas of criminal 
justice, including policing, alternate sanctions, and prisoner re-entry programs.” 
Id.; see KYM DOSSETOR, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION TO CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
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imprisonment probably outweighs the damage non-serious 
crimes inflict on the community.290 
While the link between re-offending and prior criminality 
is strongest in relation to minor offenses, it is not negligible 
in relation to serious offenses. The most wide-ranging study 
of the trajectory of offenders in Australia was undertaken by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and released in August, 
2010, in a report titled, “An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment 
Trends in Australia.”291 
The report noted that for prisoners released between 
1994 and 1997, about 20% were re-imprisoned within two 
years, one-quarter were re-imprisoned within three years, 
and 40% by the end of the ten-year survey period.292 Thus, 
most of the prison population examined was made up of 
people who had been in prison before. Moreover, the data 
showed that prisoners with prior imprisonment were twice 
as likely as first-timers to return to prison.293 
In terms of re-imprisonment trends by offense type, it 
was noted that by June 30, 2007, the offenders who were 
most commonly re-imprisoned were those sentenced for 
burglary (58%), theft (53%), robbery (45%), assault offenses 
(44%), and sexual assault (21%).294 
Given the limits of predicting serious offending on the 
basis of prior convictions, selective incapacitation for serious 
offenses seems to be flawed. However, there is stronger 
evidence that general incapacitation does work in relation to 
such offenses. While most serious offenders do not re-offend, 
  
RESEARCH 7 (2012), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/4/F/
%7bA4FA76DE-535E-48C1-9E60-4CF3F878FD8D%7dtbp042.pdf. 
 290. See Bagaric & Alexander, The Fallacy that is Incapacitation, supra note 
275, at 114. 
 291. See JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS, AN ANALYSIS OF REPEAT IMPRISONMENT TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA USING 
PRISONER CENSUS DATA FROM 1994 TO 2007, 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A4BE29D48C
A25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031_aug%202010.pdf. 
 292. Id. at 16. 
 293. Id. at 19. 
 294. Id. at 30. 
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individuals with previous convictions for serious offenses295 
commit crime at a greater frequency than the rest of the 
criminal population. Further, offenders with prior 
convictions for serious offenses re-offend more frequently 
than first-time offenders. 
There is insufficient empirical data to enable accurate 
and forensic choices to be made about how much extra prison 
time should be imposed on recidivists. However, at some 
point, there is a diminishing marginal return in terms of 
offenses prevented for each year of prison time. In addition, 
in any decision-making calculus, certain consequences (in the 
form of additional prison time) need to carry more weight 
than speculative outcomes (in the form of whether or not a 
particular offender would have actually re-offended). 
Therefore, while a recidivist loading for serious offenses is 
justified, it should be relatively minor, say, twenty to fifty 
percent. 
Accordingly, the goal of incapacitation can justify a 
penalty increase, but only in relation to serious offenses and 
where the offender has prior convictions. 
The converse also applies in relation to first time 
offenders. As noted above, first-time offenders, and those 
with a minor criminal record, reoffend at a considerably 
lower rate than offenders with a significant criminal 
history.296 All offenders with a good criminal record should 
receive a sentencing discount. The definition of a good 
criminal record is admittedly obscure. For reasons of clarity 
a good prior track record should be confined to first offenders. 
The reduction to this end, should be in the order of 25%, an 
order that is meaningful, but at the same time does not result 
in disproportionately low sentences.  
In Part II of this Article, I noted that in all sentencing 
systems there is a heavy loading that is applicable to 
recidivists. I have recently argued that this premium is too 
  
 295. For reasons discussed in Part VI of this Article, serious offenses are 
confined to sexual and assault offenses. 
 296. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, First-Time Offender; Productive 
Offender; Offender with Dependants: Why the Profile of Offenders (Sometimes) 
Matters in Sentencing, 78 ALB. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2014). 
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weighty.297 However, victimology studies establish that 
sexual and violent offenses (unlike other offenses) often have 
a lasting destructive impact on the lives of victims.298  
5. Overview of Aggravating and Mitigating 
Considerations Stemming from Sentencing Objectives. Thus, 
from the perspective of the aims of the sentencing system, 
very few considerations should increase or decrease penalty. 
The objective of absolute deterrence is satisfied merely be 
ensuring that the penalty invoked is something that 
offenders would seek to avoid, that is, they find it unpleasant. 
It does not have to be particularly harsh. It is satisfied by a 
prison term—long or short—or, for that matter, probation or 
a non-trivial fine. 
Incapacitation is a valid sentencing aim. However, it only 
serves to justify a prison term for serious sexual and violent 
offenders. No other aggravating or mitigating considerations 
are justified by reference to the objectives of sentencing. The 
obvious caveat here are considerations that relate to 
rehabilitation. If rehabilitation is established as an 
achievable sentencing aim then considerations such as 
remorse, prior good record, and spontaneous offending would 
be appropriate mitigating considerations, if it is shown that 
these traits are consistent with positive attitudinal reform 
and lead to reduced rates of recidivism. 
The above analysis supports a very limited number of 
aggravating or mitigating factors. Intuitively, this runs 
counter to entrenched sentencing methodology where many 
variations in the manner in which a crime is committed and 
the consequence of a crime can be important aggravating 
considerations. One seemingly novel conclusion stemming 
from the above analysis is that it runs counter to the view 
that premeditated criminal acts and those which cause grave 
harm to victims should be treated more harshly than 
substantive offenses of the same nature which are committed 
  
 297. Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 192. 
 298. See Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality 
of Life, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 191-92 (2010); see also MIKE DIXON ET AL., 
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, CRIMESHARE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACT OF CRIME 25 
(2006); Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’ Well-Being 
and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 
155-56 (1998). 
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spontaneously and cause little harm to a victim. Moreover, 
offenders who are solely responsible for a criminal act or who 
have a key role in an offense are currently treated more 
severely than those who have a minor role. However, this 
discord does not, in fact, follow from my approach. Rather, 
these principles are accommodated within a different 
sentencing layer, proportionalism, as opposed to the 
objectives of sentencing. It is to this doctrine that I now turn. 
VI. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING FROM 
PROPORTIONALISM 
Unlike the objectives of sentencing considered thus far, 
proportionalism is concerned with how much to punish as 
opposed to the logically prior issue of why we should punish. 
The content of the proportionality principle means, logically, 
that several mitigating and aggravating considerations are 
embedded within its construct. 
The principle of proportionality in its most basic, and 
persuasive, form requires that the seriousness of the crime is 
matched by the harshness of the penalty.299 The 
proportionality principle is adopted in all Australian 
jurisdictions. A clear statement of the principle of 
proportionality is found in the Australian High Court case of 
Hoare v The Queen: “[A] basic principle of sentencing law is 
that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should 
never exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or 
proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light 
of its objective circumstances.”300 
In Veen (No 1) v The Queen301 and Veen (No 2) v The 
Queen302 the High Court stated that proportionality is the 
primary aim of sentencing. It is considered so important that 
it cannot be trumped even by the goal of community 
protection, which at various times has also been declared as 
  
 299. See Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 
MELB. U. L. REV. 489, 492 (1994). 
 300. [1989] 167 CLR 348, 354. 
 301. [1979] 143 CLR 458, 467. 
 302. [1988] 164 CLR 465, 472. 
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the most important aim of sentencing.303 Thus, in the case of 
dangerous offenders, while community protection remains an 
important objective, at common law it cannot override the 
principle of proportionality. Proportionality has also been 
given statutory recognition in all Australian jurisdictions.304 
Proportionality is also a requirement of the sentencing 
regimes of ten states in the United States.305 It is also a core 
principle that informs the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
The Guidelines Manual states that one of the three objectives 
underpinning the Sentencing Reform Act is “proportionality 
in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately 
different sentences for criminal conduct of differing 
severity.”306 
Broken down to its core features, proportionality has two 
limbs. The first is the seriousness of the crime and the second 
  
 303. See, e.g., Channon v The Queen [1978] 20 ALR 1. 
 304. The Sentencing Act 1991 provides that one of the purposes of sentencing is 
to impose a just punishment, and that in sentencing an offender the court must 
have regard to the gravity of the offense and the offender’s culpability and degree 
of responsibility. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vict.) SS 5(1)(a), 5(2)(c), 5(2)(d). The 
Sentencing Act 1995 states that the sentence must be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offense. Sentencing Act 1995 (W. Austl.) s 6(1). The Crimes 
(Sentencing) Act 2005 provides that the sentence must be just and appropriate. 
Crimes (sentencing) Act 2005 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) s 7(1)(a). In the Northern 
Territory and Queensland, the relevant sentencing statute provides that the 
punishment imposed on the offender must be just in all the circumstances. 
Sentencing Act 1995 (N. Terr.) s 5(1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld.) 
s 9(1)(a). In South Australia, the emphasis is upon ensuring that the defendant 
is adequately punished for the offense. Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (S. 
Austl.) s 10(1)(k). The need for a sentencing court to adequately punish the 
offender is also fundamental to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth 
matters. See Crimes Act 1914 (commonwealth) s 16A(2)(k). The same phrase is 
used in the New South Wales. See Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999 (N.S.W.) 
pt 1 s 3A(a). 
 305. See Gregory S. Schneider, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 241, 250-58 (2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois, 
Oregon, Washington and West Virginia). 
 306. The most basic objective is to “combat crime through an effective, fair 
sentencing system” through (i) “honesty in sentencing” (i.e., removing the power 
of the parole commission to reduce the term to be served); (ii) “reasonable 
uniformity in sentencing—by reducing the wide disparity of sentences for similar 
offenses”; and (iii) “proportionate sentences.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra 
note 40, § 1.3.  
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is the harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a 
quantitative component—the two limbs must be matched. In 
order for the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the 
crime must be equal to the harshness of the penalty. 
Some commentators have argued that proportionality is 
so vague as to be meaningless in light of the fact that there 
is no stable and clear manner in which the punishment can 
be matched to the crime. Jesper Ryberg notes that one of the 
key and damaging criticisms of proportionality is that it 
“presupposes something which is not there, namely, some 
objective measure of appropriateness between crime and 
punishment.”307 The most obscure aspect of proportionality is 
that there is no established and clear manner in which the 
punishment can be matched to the crime. Jesper Ryberg 
further notes that to give content to the theory it is necessary 
to rank crimes, rank punishments, and anchor the scales.308 
There is some merit in Ryberg’s critique. And, as noted 
by Ian Leader-Elliott and George Fletcher, the application of 
the proportionality principle is especially difficult in the case 
of offenses such as drug offenses, where there is no direct, 
clear and observable harm caused by the crime.309 The 
principle of proportionality applies to offenders who traffic in 
drugs no less than it does to offenders who inflict injury or 
death. In the trafficking offenses, however, there is not the 
same intuitive, retributive ground for determining a 
punishment to fit the offense. There is no natural measure of 
proportionality in offenses that are supposed to secure the 
common good. The American theorist, George Fletcher, 
makes the point in his discussion of crimes of lese majeste: 
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in turn 
requires sensitivity to the injury inflicted. . . . The more the victim 
suffers, the more pain should be inflicted on the criminal. In the 
context of betrayal, the gears of this basic principle of justice, the 
  
 307. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 184 (2004). 
 308. See id. at 185. Even retributivists have been unable to invoke the 
proportionality principle in a manner which provides firm guidance regarding 
appropriate sentencing ranges. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW 
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 122 (2005). 
 309. Ian Leader-Elliott, Sentencing by Weight: Proposed Changes to the 
Commonwealth Code Serious Drug Offenses, 36 CRIM. L.J. 265, 278 (2012). 
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lex talionis, fail to engage the problem. The theory of punishment 
does not mesh with the crime when there is no tangible harm, no 
friction against the physical welfare of the victim.310 
While, doctrinally, it has been argued that there is a 
manner in which firmer content could be accorded to the 
proportionality doctrine,311 an exact matching of offense 
severity and penalty harshness is not feasible in light of the 
current understanding of proportionalism. 
However, this is not an issue that needs to be settled and 
resolved for current purposes. Irrespective of the precise 
manner in which harmfulness is assessed, it is clear that a 
cardinal criterion is the extent to which it sets back the 
interests and flourishing of victims. Accordingly, homicide 
offenses are the most serious. Offenses causing considerable 
degrees of permanent impairment—whether physical or 
mental—also rate highly, as do sexual offenses.312 Culpability 
is also an entrenched aspect of this limb of the proportionality 
thesis.313 Andrew Von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg contend that 
the “seriousness of a crime has two dimensions: harm and 
culpability. Harm refers to the injury done or risked by the 
act; culpability, to the factors of intent, motive and 
circumstance that determine the extent to which the offender 
should be held accountable for the act.”314 
Thus, it follows that considerations that relate to 
culpability are capable of aggravating or mitigating penalty. 
For this reason, planned offenses are more serious than those 
committed spontaneously, and offenders who have a central 
role in a crime are more blameworthy than peripheral 
players. 
Further, the impact of the crime on victims and the effect 
of the sanction on offenders should also impact the penalty. 
Acts by offenders which reduce the level of the harm 
stemming from the offense should be mitigatory. This 
  
 310. Id. (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF 
RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993)). 
 311. See Bagaric, Injecting Content, supra note 221, at 412.  
 312. See id. at 433.  
 313. Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-
Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1991). 
 314. Id.  
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consideration applies most acutely in relation to property 
offenses because the value of the loss can be measured 
precisely (apart from where the property has sentimental 
value). It is manifest that a victim who has $10,000 stolen 
from him or her which is returned by the offender suffers far 
less than a victim of a $10,000 theft who receives no 
restitution. 
On the other side of the proportionality equation, the 
same reasoning applies. The main criterion regarding 
penalty severity is the extent to which the penalty sets back 
the interests and flourishing of offenders. Prison is damaging 
because human beings have an innate desire for freedom and 
the capacity to shape their activities and lives according to 
their preferences. Moreover, certain prison conditions are 
considerably harsher than those typically designated by this 
type of sanction. The harshest prison conditions are those 
found in super-maximum prisons.315 These prisons normally 
consist of “jails within prisons.”316 There is no uniformity to 
such conditions but, in general, they involve “incarcerating 
inmates under highly isolated conditions with severely 
limited access to programs, exercise, staff, or other 
inmates.”317 
It is generally accepted that the first super-maximum 
prison was the rock fortress Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay, 
which was operated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons 
from 1934 until its closure in 1963.318 However, this prison 
bears little semblance to modern super-maximum prisons. 
The conditions which typically manifest in current super-
  
 315. See RUTGERS UNIV. PRESS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 9 
(Jeffrey Ian Ross ed., 2013) (discussing operations of supermax prisons in each of 
nine countries).   
 316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L INST. OF CORR. SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW 
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 (1999).  
 317. Id. They have also been defined as “. . . a free-standing facility, or a distinct 
unit within a facility, that provides for the management and secure control of 
inmates who have been officially designated as exhibiting violent or seriously 
disruptive behavior while incarcerated. . . . [T]heir behavior can be controlled only 
by separation, restricted movement, and limited direct access to staff and other 
inmates.” Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in 
Search of a Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 170 (1999). 
 318. King, supra note 317, at 165-66. 
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maximum conditions can be traced back over forty years to 
the lockdown which occurred in the U.S. Prison at Marion, 
Illinois, following increasing prisoner misbehavior, including 
the killing of two prison officers.319 More than thirty U.S. 
states now have super-maximum prisons.320 
Super-maximum prisons are now part of the landscape 
in a large number of countries, including Great Britain, 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil and the 
Netherlands.321 There is no consistency regarding the exact 
daily regimes of prisoners, but it can include being locked in 
their cells for up to twenty-three hours per day.322 Inmates 
often do not have access to fresh air, direct sunlight, or 
educational facilities, and have limited visiting rights and 
access to communications facilities.323 In some circumstances, 
the regime is less restrictive, but it always involves being 
warehoused in a concrete room and the time spent out of a 
cell is, in effect, spent in a slightly larger concrete cell. 
This type of incarceration is far harsher than 
mainstream prison conditions. It should be reflected in the 
sanction limb of the proportionality thesis and, hence, result 
in a reduction of penalty in the order of fifty percent.324 
  
 319. Id. at 165. 
 320. Id. at 163. 
 321. See generally RUTGERS UNIV. PRESS, supra note 315 (discussing the 
operations in each of these countries).  
 322. See R v Benbrika & Ors (Ruling No. 20) [2008] VSC 80 [30] (Austl.). 
 323. NSW COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, Inquiry into Issues Relating to the 
Operations and Management of the Department of Corrective Services 2 (Jan. 30, 
2006), available at http://parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/
6F44CC02AA91917CCA25711700015742 (Austl.); see also DAVID BROWN, The 
Effect of Terrorism and Terrorist Trails on Australian Prison Regimes, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 
CONFERENCE 64-65 (Chris Cuneen & Michael Salter eds., 2008). 
 324. This limb of the proportionality principle is also reflected in the view that 
sanctions should be structured so that they have the same impact on offenders 
who are deserving of the same punishment. As noted by Andrew Ashworth, the 
need for equal impact of sanctions minimally entails that, “the system should 
strive to avoid grossly unequal impacts on offenders. . . . ” ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 80 (2d ed., 1995). A 50% reduction is the 
amount that previously has been accorded by Australian courts for harsh prison 
conditions. See Mirko Bagaric et al., (Particularly) Burdensome Prison Time 
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The impact on the offender is not always confined to the 
immediate deprivation stemming from the crime. Offending 
can have collateral but real deprivations in the form of public 
opprobrium, reduction of opportunities, and injury by the 
offender during the commission of the offense. In Australia, 
the balance of authority indicates that shame can be a 
mitigating factor but that it generally carries little weight. In 
Kenny v The Queen the court stated that public shame could 
be given some weight if it was so significant as to damage the 
person physically or psychologically.325 In R v Nuttall; Ex 
parte Attorney-General (Qld) the view was taken that “the 
respondent’s loss of employment and lack of job prospects on 
his release are relevant considerations” in sentencing.326 
Further, where an offender is harmed in the course of 
committing an offense, it can reduce the penalty. In R v 
Hannigan, Justice Chesterman stated: 
[T]he theory which underlies the relevance of extra-curial 
punishment to sentence is that it deters an offender from re-
offending by providing a reminder of the unhappy consequence of 
criminal misconduct, or it leaves the offender with a disability, 
some affliction, which is a consequence of criminal activity. In such 
cases one can see that a purpose of sentencing by the court, 
deterrence or retribution, has been partly achieved.327 
All of these deprivations are directly related to the crime. 
They are not imposed by the sentencing judge; however, the 
pain is just as real and hence they should be capable of 
reducing the sentence. Further, unintended harm caused to 
victims by offenders—such as emotional distress—is capable 
of aggravating penalty, and, to enable unintended harm—so 
far as the sentencing court is concerned—caused to offenders 
as a result of the offense to reduce penalty, injects a degree 
of coherency into this area of sentencing law. 
  
Should Reduce Imprisonment Length—and Not Merely in Theory, 38 MELB. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6). 
 325. [2010] NSWCCA 6 [49] (Austl.); see also Ryan v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 
267 (Austl.). 
 326. [2011] QCA 120 [59] (Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreeing) (Austl.). 
 327. [2009] 193 A Crim R 399 [25]. 
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VII. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING 
FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
Having ascertained the mitigating and aggravating 
factors that stem from the objectives of sentencing and 
proportionalism, it is necessary to widen the examination to 
determine whether the substantive criminal law underpins 
any such considerations. Ostensibly, the answer is no. The 
substantive criminal law demarcates the distinction between 
behavior that is a crime and that which attracts no criminal 
liability. This distinction is done by setting out the nature of 
criminal acts, each of which is separated into distinct 
elements, and defining defenses to those acts. Each criminal 
act has a maximum penalty, and, as we saw in Part III of this 
Article in the case of offenses committed in the United States, 
often a presumptive penalty. 
The objectives of the substantive criminal law are 
reflected in the designation of the type of behavior which is 
categorized as a crime and the parameters as defined by the 
elements of the offense. Complex policy decisions inform the 
decisions regarding which type of behavior to criminalize. All 
western nations, with varying degrees of specificity, 
proscribe conduct that involves deliberate infringements on 
the right to life, bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, liberty 
and property. Criminalization often extends well beyond 
these parameters to include behavior such as drug use and 
road traffic compliance.328 Once these decisions have been 
made, there seems to be no further scope for the elements of 
the crime to influence sentence, beyond the sentence that has 
already been designated for the offense. 
Thus, it might appear that a premeditated murder is 
more serious than a spur-of-the-moment killing, and a 
$100,000 theft is worse than a theft of $10; however, if these 
differences are meaningful, they should presumably be 
reflected either in the different substantive classification of 
the offenses or maximum or presumptive penalties. In fact, 
this often is the case. Thus, for example, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines create a higher penalty for thefts in 
  
 328. Mirko Bagaric, The “Civil-isation” of the Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. L.J. 184, 
188 (2005). 
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excess of $10,000.329 Once these parameters are set and 
accommodated, the impact of the substantive criminal law on 
sentencing is arguably exhausted. 
However, on closer reflection, an area of substantive 
criminal law that can influence mitigating and aggravating 
considerations is criminal defenses. In general, the 
substantive criminal law draws strict lines relating to the 
applicability of defenses. All criminal law systems have 
narrow and often technical defenses to crime. They are often 
based on general over-arching excuses and justifications330 
which are recognized in some form by most western criminal 
justice systems. The key excuses which can exculpate 
otherwise criminal conduct are self-defense, duress or 
coercion, necessity and insanity.331 The criteria for legal 
excuses are necessarily narrow due to the binary nature of 
criminal law, that is, offenders are either guilty or innocent 
and, if the latter, they are beyond the bounds of legal censure 
or punishment. Sentencing, on the other hand, is not so clear-
cut and there is potential scope for degrees of blame and 
wrongdoing that can be accommodated by adjusting the level 
of punishment. 
Thus, circumstances that are similar to those that could 
attract a legal defense, but fall short of constituting a 
criminal defense should potentially, at least, constitute 
mitigating considerations. This approach has the additional 
advantage of injecting a degree of coherency and consistency 
throughout the criminal law system. All of the defenses have 
discrete elements that need to be satisfied in order to excuse 
what is otherwise criminal behavior.332 The exact content of 
  
 329. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 330. The difference between excuse and justification is not relevant for the 
purposes of broader observations regarding the distinction, see Mirko Bagaric, 
Australia, in ALAN REED & MICHAEL BOHLANDER, GENERAL DEFENSES IN CRIMINAL 
LAW—DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, 
Australia].  
 331. See TEN, supra note 1, ch. 5 (discussing the justification of criminal 
excuses).  
 332. See Stephen S. Schwartz, Is there a Common Law Necessity Defense in 
Federal Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259 (2008) (discussing the elements 
of necessity and its divergence in some United States jurisdictions). For a 
discussion of the elements of duress, see Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior: 
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these defenses varies slightly across jurisdictions.333 
However, the justification and rationale for the defenses are 
universal.334  
Failed criminal defenses have a link to exculpatory 
criminal behavior, and, hence, should logically attract 
mitigation. However, if they are to operate in this way, their 
impact should be minor given that the substantive law has 
determined that they fall short of meeting the elements of the 
defense. In mathematical terms, such considerations 
warrant no more than, say, a ten percent discount. 
Intoxication is also a defense to crime in limited 
situations335 and, hence, can potentially operate as a 
mitigating factor when the extent of intoxication is not 
sufficient to constitute a defense. However, on balance, it 
should not operate in this manner. The conceptual basis for 
intoxication operating as a defense is disputable and there is 
a clear link between intoxication and crime. In particular, a 
large amount of violence is alcohol-fueled.336 The link between 
alcohol and crime is well-known and it is foreseeable to most 
people that consumption of alcohol may increase the 
likelihood of engaging in crime. There is in fact a powerful 
argument for making intoxication an aggravating factor—as 
is generally the case in Australia.337 Thus, it follows that 
alcohol consumption should not reduce penalties. 
  
Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying 
on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575 (2011). 
 333. See Schwartz, supra note 332, at 1260; see also Bedi, supra note 332, at 
579, 591-92. The differences are irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion, 
given that any argument for extending a legal excuse to a mitigating sentencing 
consideration is necessarily based on the fact that elements of the defense have 
not been fully satisfied. 
 334. The justifications are discussed in Bagaric, Australia, supra note 330.  
 335. Id. 
 336. Anthony Morgan & Amanda McAtamney, Key Issues in Alcohol-Related 
Violence, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, http://www.aic.gov.au/
publications/current%20series/rip/1-10/04.html (Dec. 2009). 
 337. See R v Currie [1988] 33 A Crim R 7 (Austl.); see also Baumer v The Queen 
[1987] 27 A Crim R 143 (Austl.); R v Laffey [1998] 1 VR 155, 160-62 (Austl.); 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Martin [2009] VSCA 316 [6] (Austl.); R v Henry 
[1999] 106 A Crim R 149 [192] (Austl.).  
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Similar considerations apply in relation to provocation 
which is a defense in some jurisdictions. Once again, the 
doctrinal underpinnings of the defense are dubious. The 
main flaw in provocation as a defense is that it assumes that 
people who lash out because of a loss of self-control are 
assumed to be less blameworthy than those who harm others 
for other reasons. This presumption assumes that anger is an 
emotion that should be accommodated by the law. This 
rationale is flawed for two key reasons. First, anger should 
be not rewarded more than other demonstrably less 
objectionable emotions. As noted by Arenson et al.:  
[T]here is no reason in logic or principal for allowing anger alone to 
serve as an excuse. As noted by J. Horder, 
why do we regard anger as an excusing condition but not 
killings motivated by spite, greed, and lust? Or for that 
matter, if the current defense of provocation is used as a 
benchmark for the development of legal principle, why do we 
not allow emotions that are palpably desirable to be similarly 
excusatory when they manifest an intention to kill? Is it 
justifiable that a person who kills another out of love and 
kindness in a euthanasia scenario should be guilty of murder, 
yet an accused who kills in anger should be convicted of the 
lesser crime of voluntary manslaughter?338 
The other flaw with the provocation defense is that it 
relies on the assumption that anger should exculpate crime 
because it is unavoidable. Thus, provocation is viewed as a 
concession to the frailty of human nature.339 The view that 
anger is a natural human feeling that reduces self-control, 
making law-abiding behavior more difficult,340 is flawed. It 
has been noted that humans have a far greater capacity to 
  
 338. KEN ARENSON ET. AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE COMMON LAW 
JURISDICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 4 (2011) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 194, 197 (Clarendon 
Press 1992)). 
 339. See Stanley Yeo, Peisley: Case and Comment, 16 CRIM. L.J. 197, 198-99 
(1992). 
 340. Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on 
a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 1001 (2002). 
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control emotions than is suggested by the provocation 
defense.341  
Anger is an undesirable and damaging emotion. It is not 
a mindset that should be accommodated by the law. 
Individuals need to take responsibility for their conduct. Any 
legal principle that departs from this premise on the basis of 
speculation (i.e., people cannot control their emotions) is 
flawed and should be abolished and, hence, provocation 
should not be a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
While intoxication—and, in some cases, provocation—is 
a recognized defense that should not be a mitigating 
consideration, there is one consideration in which the reverse 
applies, in that it cannot provide a defense to a criminal act 
but should be a mitigating factor. Several theorists have 
argued that poverty should exculpate crime in some 
circumstances.342 While this idea has not influenced the 
operation of the substantive criminal law, it is clear that 
wealth confers choice and opportunity, while poverty is 
restrictive and often leads to frustration and resentment. 
Rich people who commit crime are, arguably, more 
blameworthy than the poor who engage in the same conduct 
because the capacity of the rich to do otherwise is greater. 
Yet, it has been argued that we cannot allow poverty to 
mitigate criminal punishment.343 Otherwise, we potentially 
license or encourage people to commit crime. There is 
considerable force in this latter perspective. There is a non-
reducible baseline standard of conduct that is expected of all 
individuals, no matter how poor. It is never tolerable to inflict 
serious bodily or sexual injury on another person. Deprived 
background should not mitigate such crimes. However, a 
stronger argument can be made in favor of economic 
deprivation mitigating other forms of offenses, such as drug 
  
 341. Luke Neal & Mirko Bagaric, Provocation: The Ongoing Subservience of 
Principle to Tradition, 67 J. CRIM. L. 237, 246-47 (2003).   
 342. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51 (3d prtg. 1973); see also Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social 
Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe 
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 85-90 (1985). 
 343. See generally Mirko Bagaric, Rich Offender, Poor Offender: Why it 
(sometimes) Matters in Sentencing, LAW & INEQ. (forthcoming 2015). 
1228 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
and property crimes. In relation to these offenses, the impact 
on victims is generally less severe, and hence, the burden of 
poverty is the more compelling consideration. It should be 
reflected in a discount for impoverished non-violent and non-
sexual offenses.344 
VIII. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS STEMMING 
FROM THE GENERAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
The third point of reference that affects the choice of 
aggravating and mitigating considerations is the legal 
system as a whole. Most of the objectives of the legal system 
in general are too broad to drive any particular sentencing 
considerations. At the broadest level, the objectives of the 
legal system involve the need to co-ordinate, control and 
regulate human behavior by establishing binding norms that 
comply with the cardinal rule of law virtues in the form of 
clarity, certainty and fairness.345 
However, there are some particular pragmatic and 
doctrinal aspects of the legal system that are capable of 
directing sentencing law and practice. The main 
consideration of this nature is the need for efficiency in the 
disposition of criminal matters. Justice should be swift.346 
Accordingly, the state has an interest in reducing the delay 
between the time of charge, verdict and sentence. There is 
also a preference to minimize the cost of the legal system. 
Hence, measures should be put in place to reduce the number 
of criminal trials. Offenders who plead guilty are less of a 
financial burden on the community than those who contest 
matters, and a guilty plea generally finalizes such matters 
faster. 
Thus, a strong argument can be mounted for according a 
discount to offenders who plead guilty. As noted earlier, the 
guilty plea discount is one of the two most important 
mitigating considerations in Australia. The rationale for the 
discount is summarized by Justices Gaudron, Gummow and 
  
 344. See id. at 19-26.  
 345. See RAZ, supra note 206, at 214-17; FINNIS, supra note 206, at 270-71. 
 346. See Speedy Trial Act 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3171; Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Jago v 
District Court [NSW] [1989] 168 CLR 23 [32] (Austl.). 
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Callinan in a decision by the High Court of Australia in 
Cameron v The Queen: 
Australian courts have enthusiastically embraced the proposition 
that a person who pleads guilty should receive a lesser sentence 
than one who pleads not guilty and is convicted. In so far as a plea 
of guilty indicates remorse and contrition on the part of the 
defendant, the courts have long recognised it as a mitigating factor 
of importance. But in recent years, under the pressure of delayed 
hearings and ever increasing court lists, Australian courts have 
indicated that they will regard a plea of guilty as a mitigating factor 
even when no remorse or contrition is present. They have taken the 
pragmatic view that giving sentence “discounts” to those who plead 
guilty at the earliest available opportunity encourages pleas of 
guilty, reduces the expense of the criminal justice system, reduces 
court delays, avoids inconvenience to witnesses and prevents the 
misuse of legal aid funds by the guilty.347  
The time and cost-savings stemming from guilty pleas 
provide powerful arguments in favor of maintaining the 
discount. Absent the guilty plea discount, there is no 
incentive for accused persons to plead guilty, no matter how 
compelling the case against them. It would, in fact, be 
contrary to the best interests of the accused to plead guilty. 
This was a point noted in R v Shannon: 
If a plea of guilty . . . cannot be regarded as a factor in mitigation of 
penalty, there is no incentive . . . for an offender to 
admit . . . guilt . . . if the offender has nothing to gain by admitting 
guilt, he will see no reason for doing so.348 
Apart from time and cost-savings—and the 
consequential reduction in court delays—it has also been 
suggested that another reason in support of the guilty plea 
discount is that it avoids inconvenience to witnesses. In R v 
Thomson the court noted: 
A plea permits the healing process to commence. A victim does not 
have to endure the uncertainty of not knowing whether he or she 
will be believed, nor the skepticism sometimes displayed by friends 
  
 347. Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6 [39] (Austl.) (emphasis added). 
 348. R v Shannon [1979] 21 SASR 442, 451 (Austl.).  
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and even family prior to a conviction. A victim will also be spared 
the personal rumination of the events . . . .349 
The persuasiveness of this justification involves a degree 
of speculation. The court in R v Thomson recognized that this 
“is a consideration which varies to a significant degree with 
the nature of, and circumstances of, an offence.”350 
Nevertheless, at least in some circumstances, the avoidance 
of inconvenience and distress to witnesses may have a value 
worth rewarding through a guilty plea discount. 
The legal system also has a preference for substantive 
accuracy over pragmatic expedience, and hence, the discount 
should not be so large as to entice the innocent to plead 
guilty.351 In Australia, the normal range of the discount is 
between ten percent and about thirty percent, depending on 
the circumstances of the case. In several jurisdictions it is 
either conventional or a statutory requirement to indicate the 
size of the discount.352 The discount range seems to have 
  
 349. [2000] 49 NSWCCA 309, 386 (Austl.). 
 350. Id.  
 351. See Mirko Bagaric & Julie Brebner, The Solution to the Dilemma Presented 
by the Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea—I’m Pleading Guilty Only 
Because of the Discount, 30 INT’L J. SOC. LAW 51, 51 (2002). 
 352. In New South Wales and Queensland, the Court must indicate if it does not 
award a sentencing discount in recognition of a guilty plea. Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 22(2); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(3). 
In South Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales, the courts often 
specify the size of the discount given. In Victoria, section 6AAA of the Sentencing 
Act 1991 (Vic) states that when courts provide a discount for a plea of guilty, they 
must specify the sentence that would have been given in the absence of that 
discount. Sentencing Act 1991 (VIC) s 6AAA. The rationale and size of the typical 
discount in Victoria is discussed in Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 [26-
31]. There has been some judicial comment as to the artificiality of section 6AAA 
given the instinctive synthesis that produces the actual sentence. See Scerri v The 
Queen [2010] VSCA 287 [23]–[25]; R v Flaherty (No 2) [2008] 19 VR 305; see also 
RICHARD FOX & ARIE FREIBERG, SENTENCING: STATE AND FEDERAL OFFENDERS 326-
27 (2d ed., 1999); GERALDINE MACKENZIE & NIGEL STOBBS, PRINCIPLES OF 
SENTENCING 90-91 (2010). In Western Australia, section 9AA of the Sentencing 
Act 1995 (WA) permits a court to reduce a sentence by up to 25% for a plea entered 
into at the first reasonable opportunity. In South Australia, recent legislative 
changes allow for a guilty plea reduction of up to 40% for an early guilty plea. See 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) (Guilty Pleas) Amendment Act 2012 (SA) (introducing 
sections 10B and 10C into the section Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA)). 
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struck an effective balance between all of the respective 
considerations. 
Another aim of the law is to encourage legal observance 
and achieve effective enforcement when the law is violated. 
Thus, a key aim of the legal system is to reduce crime and 
make offenders accountable for their crimes. This broad aim 
is also, arguably, an aim of the sentencing system. The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that “the [Sentencing 
Reform] Act’s basic objective was to enhance the ability of the 
criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective, 
fair sentencing system.”353 The Guidelines add that “most 
observers of the criminal law argue that the ultimate aim of 
the law itself, and of punishment in particular, is the control 
of crime.”354 
Thus, as a matter of public policy, the law should 
encourage those involved in criminal behavior to betray the 
confidence reposed in each other by providing a significant 
discount at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice 
system.355 This is especially apposite given that it often places 
the offender in personal danger.356 
The discount for co-operating with authorities should be 
considerable given its importance to the legal system as a 
whole. Indeed, in Australia, it is already one of the most 
compelling mitigating factors.357 In terms of the size of the 
discount that is available, it has been held that the discount 
for a plea of guilty and assistance to authorities should be up 
to fifty percent.358 As with the guilty plea discount, this 
  
 353. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2. 
 354. Id. at 4.  
 355. Malvaso v The Queen [1989] 168 CLR 227, 239 (Deane and McHugh, JJ). 
 356. R v Barber [1976] 14 SASR 388, 390 (Bray CJ); see also Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Cth) v AB [2006] 94 SASR 316. 
 357. See Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(h); Crimes (Sentencing) 
Procedure Act 1999 (NSW) s 23; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 
10(1)(h), 10A; Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 8(5); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 
(ACT) s 36. There are also similar provisions at the Commonwealth level. See 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16(2)(h) (Austl.). 
 358. For an example of where a fifty percent discount was allowed, see R v 
Johnston [2008] 186 A Crim R 345 [15]-[21] (Nettle JA). For an application of 
these principles, see Dan Ning Wang v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 319 [31]-[32]; 
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benefit is given independent of any reasons or remorse that 
might be demonstrated by assisting the authorities. 
An even more wide-ranging objective of criminal justice 
is that the innocent should not be punished.359 Accordingly, 
the impact of the penalty visited on others is a relevant 
consideration. The impact of a sentence on individuals other 
than the offender comes in degrees. Nearly every individual 
is socially connected. However, some people are cardinal to 
the flourishing of others. Offenders are sometimes the 
financial, social, and emotional cornerstones to the lives of 
other individuals. Their confinement could have a 
devastating impact on those closely associated to them; 
typically, their children or spouse. It is accepted in Australia 
that hardship to others can constitute a mitigating factor. 
However, the hardship on others must reach a level that is 
exceptional in order to be relevant to sentence.360 In R v 
Berlinsky361 Justice Doyle stated: “The effect of an order of 
imprisonment on the dependents and immediate family of 
the imprisoned person is often a sad feature of the sentencing 
process. A court can make some allowance for it, but usually 
only in exceptional cases.” 
It could be countered that the consequence of a sanction 
reduction on the basis of the impact on the relatives of the 
offender provides a license for the well-connected to commit 
crime. The reality is that the utility of this supposed license 
is greatly reduced by capping the weight for this 
consideration to, say, a maximum of ten percent. 
Thus, mitigating factors stemming from this wider 
context are: 
  
Yue Ma v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 320. This contrasts with the decision in R 
v Sahari [2007] VSCA 235 [16]-[17], where it was held undesirable to specify a 
discount for co-operating with authorities. 
 359. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 216, at 180.  
 360. The basis for the test of exceptional hardship to translate into a mitigating 
factor that may lead to the offender avoiding an immediate term of imprisonment 
was established in the seminal case of R v Wirth [1976] 14 SASR 291, 295. 
 361. [2005] SASC 316 [28]; see also R v Day [1998] 100 A Crim R 275 at 277-78 
per Wood J. 
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 pleading guilty; 
 providing assistance to authorities; and 
 considerable hardship to dependents. 
IX. SUMMARY OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING 
CONSIDERATIONS  
Overall, there should only be seventeen considerations 
that aggravate or mitigate penalty. The relevant aggravating 
factors are: 
 prior criminal record; 
 high degree of involvement in crime; 
 high degree of planning; and 
 high level of harm. 
The relevant mitigating considerations are: 
 spontaneous offense; 
 severe impact from punishment; 
 incidental punishment; 
 restitution of property; 
 self-defense; 
 necessity; 
 duress or coercion; 
 mental illness (falling short of insanity); 
 plea of guilty; 
 assistance to authorities; 
 harm to dependents; 
 deprived socio-economic background (in relation to 
non-violent and non-sexual offenses only); and  
 clean criminal record. 
 
In order to ensure consistency and transparency, it is 
important to attribute weight to each of the considerations. 
There is no accepted theory regarding the respective weight 
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of aggravating or mitigating factors362 and, obviously, the 
exact weight accorded to the considerations involves a degree 
of approximation. However, this is less desirable than 
leaving the matters to the discretion of individual sentencing 
judges363 and allows for informed revision of any weightings 
if practice uncovers any errors or unintended consequences 
stemming from the stated position. 
The weightings that should be attributed to some of the 
considerations have been disclosed above; however, for the 
sake of comprehensiveness, a maximum weighting should be 
attached to all considerations. To this end, all of the 
mitigating factors which are, in effect, failed criminal 
defenses should attract a minor departure from penalty of, 
say, more than 10%. In a similar vein, the harm caused by 
the offense and the level of involvement in a crime are often 
reflected in the substantive nature of the crime, hence, these 
too should only attract a 10% variation. The degrees of 
planning, or lack of it, associated with the commission of a 
crime are two sides of the same coin and do not reflect 
strongly on the outcome of the crime, hence, they should also 
carry no more than a 10% loading. 
For reasons set out above, a criminal record should 
attract a loading of up to 50%. The current loading given to a 
plea of guilty in Australia seems to strike the balance 
between encouraging offenders not to take matters to trial, 
while not being significant enough to coerce them into 
pleading guilty even if they have a tenable defense. Thus, a 
25% reduction for pleading guilty is suitable. A similar 
discount should be granted for assisting the authorities. 
The difference in the level of hardship between normal 
and super maximum prison conditions is profound, and 
hence, attracts up to a 50% loading. The incidental 
  
 362. Jessica Jacobson & Mike Hough, Personal Mitigation in England and 
Wales, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 146, 154 (Julian V. 
Roberts ed., 2011). In an empirical study of mitigating factors based on interviews 
with sentencers, it was noted that the factors accorded most weight were clinical 
depression, support from victim’s family, drug treatment, remorse, regret, and 
moment of madness; and those with lesser weight were partner and children, 
illiterate, and abused as a child. 
 363. See Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness – The 
Need to Abolish the Stain that is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38(1) U.N.S.W. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
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punishment experienced by an offender in terms of loss of 
employment and profession can be considerable in terms of 
its impact on life flourishing, as it can be in terms of the 
impact on the flourishing of dependents. These two 
considerations should be capable of attracting a loading in 
the order of 20%. 
These factors do not operate in a simple cumulative 
manner; otherwise, a combination of mitigating factors could 
potentially amount to a discount of 100% or more. Instead, 
the discounts or additions are to be applied individually to 
the contracted sentence following application of the previous 
consideration. Thus, pleading guilty and assisting 
authorities does not lead to a 50% discount of the entire 
sentence. Rather, the discount is 43% (i.e., 25% plus the 
remaining part of the sentence [75%] multiplied by 25%). 
CONCLUSION 
Aggravating and mitigating considerations can have a 
profound effect on the sentence imposed on an offender. Yet, 
there is no accepted doctrinal theory which underpins and 
justifies those factors. The law is a complex inquiry, and it is 
not unusual for there to be an absence of consensus regarding 
the theoretical underpinning and practical application of a 
body of law. However, it is rare for the law to be in a state of 
confusion such as is the case relating to aggravating and 
mitigating considerations. There has not even been a 
considered attempt to cohere and justify this area of law, 
resulting in a jurisprudential wasteland. This Article 
attempts to provide a unifying theory. 
I conclude that considerations should only aggravate or 
mitigate sentences if they are justified by reference to one of 
four broader objectives, namely: (i) the sentencing system; (ii) 
the proportionality principle; (iii) the criminal justice system; 
or (iv) the wider well-established principles of justice. 
In summary, there should only be seventeen 












Prior criminal record 
for serious sexual and 
violent offenses 
50% Incapacitation 
High degree of 
involvement in crime 
10% Proportionality (culpability) 
High degree of 
planning 
10% Proportionality (culpability) 
High level of harm 10% 
Proportionality 
(harm to victim) 
 








Severe impact from 




(harm to offender) 
Plea of guilty 25% 
Reduce delay and cost of 
criminal justice system 





25% Proportionality (culpability) 
Restitution of property 25% 
Proportionality 
(harm to victim) 
Harm to dependents of 
the offender 
20%  
Incidental punishment 20% 
Proportionality 
(harm to offender) 
Spontaneous offending 10% Proportionality (culpability) 
Self-defense 10% 
Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal 
law) 
Necessity 10% 
Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal 
law) 
Duress or coercion 
 
10% 
Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal 
law) 
Mental illness 10% 
Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal 
law) 
 
Table 2: Mitigating Considerations 
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A limitation of the analysis in this Article is the 
uncertain nature regarding the efficacy of criminal 
punishment to achieve popular sentencing objectives. If the 
empirical data concerning the efficacy of the sentencing 
system to achieve key sentencing goals changes, it will affect 
the choice and development of aggravating and mitigating 
considerations. This is especially the case in relation to 
rehabilitation. The current empirical evidence is inconclusive 
regarding the capacity of criminal sanctions to reform 
offenders. Accordingly, mitigating factors, which are sought 
to be justified by reference to the rehabilitative ideal, should 
not be pursued. If it is established that rehabilitation is 
effective, the considerations that have an impact on the rate 
of re-offending should appear on the mitigating side of the 
ledger. Moreover, irrespective of the success of rehabilitation, 
if other considerations are established as being consistent 
with lower rates of recidivism, such as remorse, youth, and 
good character, they should also reduce penalty. 
Thus, the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in 
this Article are not necessarily determinative or fixed. 
However, this Article has sought to enshrine the 
methodology for ascertaining the validity of aggravating and 
mitigating considerations, and to clearly articulate 
considerations which, on the basis of current knowledge, are 
justifiable. The Article also sets out the relative importance 
of these mitigating factors. In this way, the contours and 
structure of sentencing law and procedure are manifestly 
clearer. 
